John Carter Brown.

37.

Salem 29044

ich Nr. 6.

REASONS

FOR KEEPING

GUADALOUPE at a Peace,

PREFERABLE TO

CANADA,

EXPLAINED IN

FIVE LETTERS,

FROM A

GENTLEMAN in GUADALOUPE,

TO HIS

FRIEND in LONDON.

LONDON:
Printed for M. COOPER, in Pater-Noster-Row

M.DCC.LXI.

[Price 1s. 6d.]

JOHN CARTER BROWN

REASONS

FOR

Keeping GUADALOUPE, &c.

LETTER I.

From a Gentleman at Guadaloupe, *to his Friend in* London.

SIR,

THE different opinions of the people concerning the value of Canada, and the value of Guadaloupe to Great-Britain, have occasioned many diſputes in private and public, in which private views have too often influenced the debate: thoſe who are for acquiring all Canada, and giving up Guadaloupe, and every thing elſe, argue in this manner; That no terms with the French can be ſecure or laſting; at the very time they are making a peace, they are contriving how to break it, and will do ſo as ſoon as any opportunity occurs to do it to advantage; That we entered into the war only upon account of America, that the French invaded our proper-

ties there, and were long contriving to do it: now that we have beaten them out of all that country, what we did never claim, as well as what we did claim, therefore we ought to keep all America, as the greateſt acquiſition we can make, or ever was made; for if we allow them the ſmalleſt footing even in Canada itſelf, we can never be ſecure, they will drive us out of that country. That the trade of North-America is the great fountain of all the Britiſh wealth and power; that of late years it furniſhes and employs ſo many ſhips, and ſo many ſailors, makes ſo great a conſumption of the produce of Great-Britain, ſends ſo much of its produce to the ſugar iſlands, and pours in ſuch a tide of wealth from the Weſt-Indies upon Britain, as enables her to make the figure ſhe now does, to the reſt of the world: That if all North-America were our own, ſhe could be drawn into no more wars on that account, our trade there would riſe to the higheſt pitch, and that country ſo extenſive, ſo rich, and full of ſo many lakes and rivers fit for navigation, would ſoon raiſe the power and naval ſtrength of Great-Britain, to a degree beyond any power on earth.

That the furr-trade might be entirely our own; That one ſhip of the Hudſon-Bay company is often ſo rich as to bring home more value than ten ſugar ſhips; That we have ſufficiency of the ſugar iſlands already; That Jamaica alone, if it were properly cultivated, can afford more ſugar than England wants, it ſends home near 40,000 hogſheads every year, when the third part is not cultivated; That Guadaloupe is a place of no ſignificancy compared with Jamaica, and could add very little ſtrength or wealth to Great-Britain; That the French have long out-done us in the hats, a trade that we may have entirely to ourſelves, by acquiring Canada; and that if we leave the French the ſmalleſt footing or poſſeſſion there, we never can be ſecure, or

ſafe

ſafe in the reſt; we have done nothing, but muſt always be liable to repeat the ſame expence.

Thoſe who wiſh the keeping of Guadaloupe, anſwer as follows: That Guadaloupe we certainly have, and that Canada we have not, the fate of it is ſtill dubious, that all the reaſoning before-mentioned is ſophiſtical and unſolid; That the advantages of North-America to Britain, excluſive of Canada, are very great; why join them all to Canada, of itſelf worth little or nothing, but to give it weight, which it has not of itſelf; if our barrier in America, ſhall be fixt by treaty to the certain limits we inſiſt upon, and Cape-Briton retain'd or demoliſh'd, we are in a much better ſituation there than ever, which would render America of much more advantage to us than it was in former times, and more ſecure, nay as ſecure as the inſtability of human affairs can admit; The benefit of North-America to Britain does not depend upon Canada at all, it is a frothy and falſe argument, Canada can add nothing but, Firſt, A little improvement of the furr-trade, which might be in very great perfection without it; Secondly, Preventing the French from diſturbing us in that quarter of the world for ſome time, and even that argument is equally ſtrong for taking the Miſſiſſippi, otherwiſe it is not concluſive.

But as it is argued that the French will never be at peace with us, it muſt follow that when they cannot make war in America they muſt diſturb us in Europe; now let thoſe gentlemen anſwer, Whether we have more advantage over the French by a war in America or a war in Flanders, when they have Oſtend, *&c.* in their hands? The preſent war compared with thoſe of King William, Queen Anne, and the war 1744, ſoon ſolves that queſtion, the ſugar trade is far preferable to the furr-trade; what does a few hats ſignify, compared with ſerving ourſelves and other countries with that article of luxury ſugar, the conſumption of which

is daily increaſing both in America and Europe, and become one of the neceſſaries of life? Jamaica has not increaſed in ſugars theſe thirty years paſt, and never can increaſe much, as the greateſt part of it is ſo mountanous, that it is not capable of culture, and cannot anſwer the expence in many places, of carrying the ſugars over mountains to be ſhipped, though they have made a monopoly for themſelves of that commodity, of a long time paſt, they muſt now be the more reluctant to part with it.

It is our ſugar iſlands that raiſe the value of North-America, and pours in ſuch wealth upon the mother-country; the more we have of thoſe iſlands, America becomes from that cauſe the more important and valuable, and England the richer: in America we have more than enough, in the ſugar iſlands a great deal too little, the nearer they can be proportioned to one another the better for both, and the more trade and wealth for England; the furr-trade does not employ the hundredth part of the ſhipping and ſeamen that the ſugar trade does.

The having all North-America to ourſelves, by acquiring Canada, dazzles the eyes, and blinds the underſtandings of the giddy and unthinking people, as it is natural for the human mind to graſp at every appearance of wealth and grandeur, yet it is eaſy to diſcover that ſuch a peace might ſoon ruin Britain: I ſay the acquiſition of Canada would be deſtructive, becauſe ſuch a country as North-America, ten times larger in extent than Britain, richer ſoil in moſt places, all the different climates you can fancy, all the lakes and rivers for navigation one could wiſh, plenty of wood for ſhipping, and as much iron, hemp, and naval ſtores, as any part of the world; ſuch a country at ſuch a diſtance, could never remain long ſubject to Britain; you have taught them the art of war, and put arms

in

in their hands, and they can furniſh themſelves with every thing in a few years, without the aſſiſtance of Britain, they are always grumbling and complaining againſt Britain, even while they have the French to dread, what may they not be ſuppoſed to do if the French is no longer a check upon them; you muſt keep a numerous ſtanding army to over-awe them; theſe troops will ſoon get wives and poſſeſſions, and become Americans; thus from theſe meaſures you lay the ſureſt foundation of unpeopling Britain, and ſtrengthening America to revolt; a people who muſt become more licentious from their liberty, and more factious and turbulent from the diſtance of the power that rules them; one muſt be very little converſant in hiſtory, and totally unacquainted with the paſſions and operations of the human mind, who cannot foreſee thoſe events as clearly as any thing can be diſcovered, that lies concealed in the womb of time; it is no gift of prophecy, it is only the natural and unavoidable conſequences of ſuch and ſuch meaſures, and muſt appear ſo to every man whoſe head is not too much affected with popular madneſs or political enthuſiaſm.

But without dipping too deep in futurity, pray what can Canada yield to Britain, in this or any ſubſequent age, but a little extenſion of the furr-trade? whereas Guadaloupe can furniſh as much ſugar, cotton, rum and coffee, as all the iſlands we have put together, and conſume a vaſt quantity of the Britiſh and American produce, from which trade the ſhipping and naval ſtrength of Britain muſt greatly increaſe, without any allowance for the cinnamon trade, which of itſelf may bring a good deal of wealth to the mother-country, as we have the wild cinnamon in common with the other iſlands, ſo we have alſo the true genuine cinnamon-tree, and have ſent home to England ſamples of it, as good as any the Dutch have.

The conſumption of ſugar is daily increaſing, both in Europe and America, and we cannot at this day ſerve ourſelves with that article, but are we not to endeavour to ſerve foreign markets if we can? Did ever the French bring half ſo much wealth to their country from hats as from their ſugar iſlands? To ſay we have ſugar enough, is to ſay we have trade enough, a new doctrine truly, and if ſo, what uſe have we for Canada? In a word, it is moſt obvious to every impartial eye, that the increaſe of the ſugar iſlands is particularly the intereſt of Britain, ſhe is there too weak, and as thoſe iſlands bring moſt wealth both to Britain and America, ſo from their weakneſs they can never be in any danger of revolting; and that every perſon, as ſoon as he can make a fortune there, comes home to the mother country and enjoys it; witneſs the number of the proprietors of the ſugar iſlands that reſide at London, and many of them ſit in parliament; if they dread Guadaloupe as a rival to their private intereſt, they muſt at the ſame time own, it is a great acquiſition to the public wealth and ſtrength. Thus Guadaloupe, one of the greateſt acquiſitions ever Britain made, acquires many powerful enemies from private views, and has nothing to plead but her public utility and advantage, often found too feeble an opponent to the private intereſt of a few.

But to conclude, nothing can ſecure Britain ſo much againſt the revolting of North-America, as the French keeping ſome footing there, to be a check upon them, if the peace be made with any tolerable attention to our barrier in America, as we may be moſt certain it will, France muſt ever after be an enemy too feeble to be dreaded in that corner of the world; but if we were to acquire all Canada, we ſhould ſoon find North-America itſelf too powerful, and too populous to be long governed by us at this diſtance; we have often, too often, waſted our blood and treaſure to raiſe up

other

other powers to wealth and ſtrength, only to be once our enemies; it were much to be wiſhed that we could take warning, and do ſo no more.

After writing what is above, ſome new arguments in favour of Canada have appeared in this part of the world, by the Gentleman's Magazine for the month of May. The publiſher of that Magazine has uſhered it in with full approbation from himſelf, that it is written with great force of argument, and compleat knowledge of the ſubject, from which we may conclude the paragraphs given us are the choiceſt of the work; the firſt remarkable paſſage is, "We want ſecurity that "the French ſhall not drive us out of that country of "America." Can any man read or anſwer this without deriſion at a time we have driven them out of it almoſt entirely? And when they began the war with a thouſand advantages they never can have again, and when the author admits we have ten times the number of people they have in that country, but granting we ſhould drive them out of Canada, will not theſe people retire and take ſhelter in Miſſiſſippi? From that circumſtance will not Miſſiſſippi be more populous and more dangerous, and all his apprehenſions be renewed from that quarter, they will drive us out of America. It is not the extent of territory, but the number of people, that makes a country formidable; Does he require no ſecurity that they ſhall not drive us out of Britain? It is America only ſeems his care.

He has next at great length given us the Indian method of making war, and how little our forts and artillery can ſerve as a ſecurity to our ſettlements, but will he take time to reflect how theſe Indians became our enemies? By our neglecting to protect them, by our allowing the French to build forts to over-awe them, even upon our own property. It then became their intereſt to adhere to the French, but now that the

ſcene

ſcene is changed, that we are in poſſeſſion of theſe forts, that we are maſters of that country, and that we only can protect them, thoſe Indians muſt and will be ours from the ſtrongeſt motives of any, that of ſelf-intereſt, and which rules them as much as any people on earth, ſo that all the terror he would raiſe from thoſe Indians, in place of frightening us, becomes ſo much additional ſtrength to us, thus his own doctrine is undone by the arguments he throws out to ſupport it, which muſt often happen when ingenuity and fancy are let looſe to argue *in vita Minerva*.

The third point advanced is, "That though America "ſhould encreaſe to a hundred million of ſouls there "would be no danger ſtill, they would depend upon "and be ſubſervient to ſeven or eight million of ſouls "in the North at ſuch a diſtance."

One is really out of countenance to anſwer ſuch abſurdities in a ſerious manner, to ſtate them is ſufficient to diſcredit them, if any man can agree to them very great is his faith.

The fourth maxim is very ingenious, "That though "none of the American gentlemen come to England "to ſpend their fortunes, it is of no conſequence at "all; is it of any importance, ſays he, to the Engliſh "farmer, whether his beef, pork, and tongues are eat "freſh at London, or ſalted at Barbadoes, and ſo of "his cheeſe, butter and ale, *&c?*" What can all that ſophiſtry tend to? Does he know ſo little of America or the Weſt-Indies, as to believe that the gentlemen of fortune in thoſe countries live upon ſalted proviſions from England? In America they have as good veniſon, in many countries beef, mutton, and pork, as they have in England, and as good poultry of all kinds. In the ſugar iſlands men of fortune have as voluptuous tables as they have in Britain, of freſh meat and

and poultry, freſh fiſh of many kinds, and plenty of turtle; Can he either perſuade himſelf or the world, that a man ſpending twelve or fifteen thouſand pounds a year, with opulence and taſte in London, does England no more ſervice than a man who ſpends it in America or the Weſt-Indies, where at his table he does not conſume fifty pounds worth of Britiſh vivres all the year round? Or does a gentleman of fortune in America or the Weſt-Indies, keep twelve or twenty ſervants in his houſe living like lords, and cloathed in the beſt manufactures of England, as he does when he lives in London? In the Weſt-Indies indeed he is ſurrounded with as many half-naked negroes in his houſe, eating the low growths of the country; that negroes are allowed, but this we are told is great force of argument, and compleat knowledge of the ſubject, though to moſt people I ſhould think thoſe arguments will appear to have no force or concluſion at all, being founded upon falſe maxims, they become only evaſions of the truth; that cauſe muſt be very weak indeed, where learning, ingenuity and eloquence, can ſuggeſt nothing ſtronger to ſupport it than ſuch unſolid ſophiſtry.

His fifth maxim is, that "Our trade to the Weſt-"India iſlands is undoubtedly a very valuable one, but "it has long been at a ſtand, our ſugar planters, limited "by the ſcantineſs of territory, ſays he, cannot in-"creaſe much, an evil that keeping Guadaloupe can-"not remedy." Now ſince the ſugar iſlands are ſo valuable, and long at a ſtand from the ſcantineſs of territory, does it not follow that more territory ſhould be acquired, if ever an opportunity to do it, rather than when we have got poſſeſſion of ſuch territory we ſhould give it up; if our ſugar iſlands are undeniably very valuable, as he aſſerts, and that all the iſlands we have do not yield 90,000 hogſheads of ſugar yearly, or above it? Is an iſland or territory that can certainly yield

yield 150,000 hogſheads a year, to be deſpiſed and given up, becauſe we want more territory? Will it make no addition to ſupply that ſcantineſs he complains of? I long to ſee how he proves that Guadaloupe cannot increaſe our ſugar trade, if he knows any thing at all about Guadaloupe, he will find this point hard to prove, that 150 is leſs than 90, or that 150 added to 90 will not increaſe the number; as ſubtle as his ſophiſtry is, it will meet with obſtructions in this proof, unleſs he come to the perſuaſive aſſertion, that Guadaloupe produces nothing at all, ſuch is the concluſive force of theſe arguments, extracted from this celebrated piece, by its admirer, the author of the Gentleman's Magazine.

The ſixth aſſertion is, "That the peopling of "America does not diminiſh the people of England, "that it does drain Britain of inhabitants, he ſays, is "founded upon ignorance of the nature of population "in new countries."

It were to be wiſhed at leaſt that he were right in this, or that his knowledge in population were communicated to the people of England, as Britain is certainly not encreaſing in its number of inhabitants, and that the number of people is the great wealth and ſtrength of every country where induſtry abounds; if two countries trading and dealing ſo deep with one another, the one encreaſing ſo faſt in people, as our author admits America does, and the other diminiſhing, notwithſtanding all the advantages of manufactories, trade and agriculture, which have ſo greatly advanced of late years; the cauſe is paſt doubt, the one is draining the other of people, or which is much the ſame in the end, the one encreaſing ſo faſt muſt ſoon be maſter of the other, that is diminiſhing it, or at beſt ſtanding ſtill.

If this ingenious gentleman had been as much a friend to North-America as he would ſeem to be, he might eaſily have diſcovered that the acquiſition of Guadaloupe muſt raiſe the value of North-America, and the trade and wealth of Britain, ten times more than all Canada can ever do (without making any allowance for the cinnamon trade;) that Guadaloupe we have, and Canada yet dubious, ſo thoſe gentlemen calculate before the time; but it is the value of Guadaloupe, not its inſignificancy, ſets ſo many pens aſtir, and ſo much eloquence employed to blind the eyes, and miſlead the underſtandings of the people of England from being ſenſible of their true intereſt, while there is any choice in their power to make, when it is conſidered, what oppoſition all other ſugar iſlands make to the keeping Guadaloupe, what a powerful people they are, how many ſit in parliament, and how many of the cities of London, Liverpool, and Briſtol, are connected with them in that trade, it can be no ſurprize that the ſtruggle and oppoſition ſhould be great, and all arts employed in ſuch a cauſe, where from jealouſy and miſtakes, they fancy the ſugar, and other valuable produce of Guadaloupe, will hurt their private intereſts, or fortunes in the other iſlands; an effect it will not produce to any ſenſible degree, while we have ſo many foreign markets to go to; though indeed it might put a ſtop to monopolies of that commodity, and make ſugar as reaſonable in England as in other countries; but the more our other iſlands dread the value and wealth of Guadaloupe, the reaſons for our keeping it becomes the ſtronger to the nation in general: to them I addreſs myſelf, I hope they will conſider that the many advantages, fairly and juſtly ſtated, ariſing to the nation from Guadaloupe, is not all the benefit, as it muſt be noticed, That ſo much of the ſugar trade taken from France, and added to Britain, muſt increaſe the difference of the political balance, in a duplicate ratio; a pound taken out of one ſcale and

put

put in the other makes two pounds difference in the balance.

As I have lived on the ſpot in Guadaloupe for ſome time, ſo from ſome intimacy with the Cuſtom-Houſe, and Naval-Office, I have had more opportunities to know the export and import of this iſland, than any body who hath yet written on the ſubject; both what it has produced, and what it can produce; and I look upon it as my duty to attempt the unveiling of the truth to my country, from thoſe clouds of darkneſs and error, that ſo many able pens have been long employed to involve it in; and if I am allowed, I may ſoon oblige the world with a more accurate deſcription of theſe conquered iſlands, as well as an authentic account of the export and import of the place, with this obſervation, that facts are ſtubborn things, they will neither bend to the force of faction and private views, nor will they yield to ſophiſtry and eloquence.

Now to conclude, let us ſuppoſe that we have ſugar enough to ſerve ourſelves, as has been aſſerted by thoſe gentlemen, and that Guadaloupe can produce one hundred and fifty thouſand hogſheads every year, a fact that can be as diſtinctly proved, as the value of any piece of ground in England, what grain it can yield with common culture; thoſe 150,000 hogſheads muſt be manufactured in Britain, and exported to foreign markets, in which caſe it is not over valued at 14*l.* the hogſhead, and ſo returns to England two millions one hundred thouſand pounds annually; include what the cinnamon trade may be, with the immenſe quantity of coffee and cotton, indico, cocoa, ginger, *&c.* exported from this iſland, together with the Britiſh manufactories imported here, with the beef, wheat, pork, butter, cheeſe, ale, ſalt-fiſh, *&c.* a man can then frame ſome judgment of the value of this place, better than by a thouſand ſuch ſophiſticated and evaſive treatiſes,

treatiſes, as thoſe that have appeared in oppoſition to Guadaloupe, when ſubtilty and reſentment are uſed to overturn all the ſolid maxims of policy and government, that have ſtood the teſt of ſo many paſt ages, and confirmed by ſo long experience.

Methinks the nation might reſt ſafe and ſatisfied in the well-known ability and integrity of ſuch a miniſtry as we are bleſt with; a miniſtry who have in ſo diſtinguiſhed a manner carried on the war, with fortitude, vigour and judgment; who have ſhewn ſo juſt a knowledge of the true intereſt of their country, and where her natural ſtrength and vigour lay: who could judge where to ſtrike a fatal blow amongſt the richeſt ſpots in the world, while our enemies and our own country were amuſing themſelves with mere empty ſhadows? I ſay we might remain well ſatisfied that ſuch a miniſtry would make a peace ſuitable to, and conſiſtent with thoſe juſt ſentiments of the true intereſt of the nation, that have ſhone ſo conſpicuouſly in managing the war: but no ſooner had we ſo unexpectedly got footing in Canada, than thoſe foes to Guadaloupe, one of the richeſt ſugar iſlands in the world, and which we were actually in poſſeſſion of; this it was thought might divert the edge of the war from theſe valuable ſugar iſlands, where France was ſo ſenſibly hurt, and ſo unable to defend: and thus the two great men at the helm were addreſſed, or rather dictated to as ſchool-boys, and their inſtructions given them with a haughtineſs very unbecoming that dignity and confidence they had ſo juſtly merited of their country; it were to be wiſhed thoſe gentlemen would deſiſt, and leave the making the peace to thoſe much abler heads, who have ſo happily conducted the war.

I am, &c.

The

The Sugar Iſlands yield as follows:

	Hhds.
Barbadoes, at a medium, annually——	12,000
Antigua, ditto ——— —	15,000
Montſerrat, ditto ——— ——	3,000
Nevis, ditto —— —	3,400
St. Kitt's, ditto —— —	14,000
Anguilla, ditto ——— —	50
Tortora, ditto ——— —	2,000
Jamaica, over-valued, at — —	40,000
	89,450

LET-

LETTER II.

SIR,

AS Canada and Guadaloupe have long been the ſubject of converſation in England and elſewhere, ſo it has occaſioned much writing and many long pamphlets of late to very little purpoſe; where they have generally left the merits of the caſe to follow ſhadows and phantoms of their own imagination, or to darken thoſe points they offer to clear up to the world. The firſt of thoſe that appeared in print, in a letter to two very great men, ſays, "We have ſugar iſlands enough of our own "already; that Jamaica of itſelf ſends home 40,000 "hogſheads every year, when the third part of it is "not cultivated:" the next of theſe writings, in ſupport of the firſt, being anſwers to the remarks on the firſt, ſays, "That our trade to the Weſt-Indies is un-"doubtedly a very valuable one; but it has long been "at a ſtand, our ſugar-planters, limited by the ſcan-"tineſs of territory, cannot increaſe much." Now, this laſt muſt appear to be a very ſatisfactory anſwer to the firſt, though they are both written on the ſame ſide of the argument, and to ſupport the ſame cauſe; but ſuch contradictions, when they do happen, are the plaineſt and moſt convincing proofs, that theſe gentlemen are both arguing and maintaining points in oppoſition to conviction, reaſon, and truth; for theſe

are always uniform, and never contradict themſelves; all methods have been uſed to prevent our acquiring more territory in the Weſt-Indies, and Canada choſen to be the object proper to put in oppoſition to Guadaloupe, and this was done at a time we had but juſt got a little footing in that country, which we cannot yet ſay we have conquered, though it is hoped we may before this campaign is at an end. Preſumption ſurely it was to determine ſo early upon the fate of a country that we had not conquered, but as Canada was of itſelf of very little ſignificancy to us, who have ſo many finer countries in America that we cannot cultivate, therefore all America, and the trade of it, were joined to Canada, to increaſe the giddineſs of unthinking people; and we are told, without Canada we could not be ſure of any thing in America; if we left the French in poſſeſſion of any part of it, they would drive us out of America altogether; no treaties, no forts were capable of defending our poſſeſſions there, nothing but having Canada can ſecure thoſe gentlemen. Now is there any thing in all this ſophiſtry that is conſiſtent with common ſenſe or truth? What ſecurity can any people have for their poſſeſſions, but treaties, forts, and ſuperior ſtrength, and we have all thoſe on our ſide? What further ſecurity can we have, unleſs they propoſe to extirpate the French from the face of the earth, which is not in their power to do, nor juſtifiable if they could? All the arguments they uſe for taking Canada, are as concluſive for taking France and Miſſiſſippi, ſure thoſe falſe gloſſes and chimerical repreſentations can impoſe upon no man of any reflection. Now let us remember how we begun the war: theſe authors have told us that the French had been contriving this war and preparing for it ſince the peace of Utrecht, but in a more particular manner ſince the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748; that they had made alliances with all the Indians, and bound them faſt in all ſhapes; that they had filled

thoſe forts, and all places of the country, with military ſtores, military men, engineers, arms, and all kinds of proviſions, which, I believe, is pretty much the truth. Now ſince they began the war with ſo much attention and preparation on their ſide, and ſo much inadvertency on ours, and that we have, notwithſtanding all theſe advantages, driven them out of all that country, and ruined their trade more than ever it was, can we tremble ſo much for them again? Can we be now afraid they will drive us out of America, when we ſhall have all theſe forts in our poſſeſſion, and all thoſe Indians at our beck, with whom, more than with their own people, they did us any hurt?

Thoſe gentlemen admit to us that we have ten times the number of people in America that the French have. In what a daſtardly ſhape do they repreſent their country, when they tell us, that one thouſand French will drive ten thouſand Britiſh out of America: has the behaviour of our countrymen at any time deſerved ſuch an aſperſion? I think I may ſay without vanity, that they have at all times behaved as gallantly and as bravely as the French: ſhameful aſſertion! it never did happen, nor never will, thoſe are phantoms of a piece with ſuch as are hatched by old women to frighten children in the nurſery. I may conclude then that we can ſafely maintain and cultivate our Plantations in North-America, and make them of much more utility to us than ever they have yet been, notwithſtanding the French retaining ſome footing in Canada. Therefore Canada in the preſent diſpute muſt ſtand upon its own legs, ſtript of thoſe imaginary properties of ſupporting and upholding all the reſt of our colonies in North-America, who can well ſupport themſelves without it; it might indeed give us a little more of the furr-trade, but what is that compared with the ſugar trade of the Weſt-Indian iſlands; nay, it is

 pretty

pretty obvious, that if our bounds and barrier in North-America are ſettled and eſtabliſhed, as we have all along contended for, we muſt carry on even the furr-trade with more advantages than the French can do with Canada in their poſſeſſion.

In the next place let us take a view of North-America with our own eyes, rather than with thoſe magic glaſſes that ſome gentlemen hold out to you, and we ſhall find it to be a country of vaſt extent of territory, happy in all the circumſtances that can promote trade, agriculture, and induſtry, advancing with haſty ſtrides towards maturity, and multiplying in people. We ſhall not only find in it all the climates that we find at home, but many more and better. It can produce every plant, grain, fruit, cattle and poultry that Great-Britain does, and many that Britain cannot.

As America increaſes in people, ſo ſhe muſt increaſe in arts and ſciences, in manufactures and trade, while ſhe has the ſame laws, liberties, and genius we have at home; the more ſhe encreaſes in theſe, the leſs ſhe muſt want from Britain; the more ſhe riſes above a certain pitch, her utility and advantage to Britain muſt proportionably decreaſe. The period is poſſibly not at ſuch a diſtance as ſome people may imagine, when they may refuſe to ſend you their tobaccoes, but export them to foreign markets themſelves; you might ſend fleets for ſome time to moleſt their coaſts, but might find yourſelves too feeble to ſend armies that could conquer; the more you waſte your ſtrength upon America with any power but France, the more you weaken yourſelf at home, and become the eaſier prey to your turbulent and reſtleſs European neighbours.

Theſe hints I ſhall only throw out to my country at preſent, as ſubjects meriting ſome conſideration, but have no neceſſity to build much upon them in the arguments

guments for keeping Guadaloupe, if in our power, rather than Canada.

Though any man who has beſtowed the ſmalleſt reflection upon the cauſes of the riſe, progreſs, and decline of ancient or modern ſtates, kingdoms, or commonwealths, will be of opinion they are not imaginary phantoms, but ſavour more of political prudence than of temerity and fiction; the ſame cauſes will naturally produce the ſame effects that they have done a thouſand years ago.

But waving thoſe matters, I ſhall proceed to conſider the advantages of North-America to Great-Britain; thoſe that ſhe has felt and may enjoy from cautious and prudent meaſures, at the ſame time not to forget from what fountains theſe advantages flow.

Thoſe gentlemen have told us what is pretty true, that North America has raiſed the naval ſtrength of Great-Britain by the number of ſhips and ſeamen it employs, that it conſumes ſo much of the produce and manufactures of Great-Britain, ſends ſo much of its own to the ſugar iſlands as pours in ſuch a tide of the wealth of the Weſt-Indies on the mother country. It is as true that the Weſt-Indies produces the wealth, as that America is part of the cauſe, as ſhe ſends to the ſugar iſlands ſo much of her lumber, ſo much rice, ſalt fiſh, flour, and biſcuit of all kinds, with cattle, and many other things, much cheaper than England can do, and by a nearer run; ſo ſhe is ſupplied from the iſlands with ſugar and rum, which ſhe cannot want; molaſſes, which ſhe ſtills into rum; coffee, ginger, cocoa, and ſeveral other things, from all which a great deal of ſhipping and ſeamen are employed: aſk any man in moſt of our American plantations, if the ſugar iſlands were ſunk in the waters, or annihilated to-morrow morning, if the value of North-America would not fall one half, both

to itſelf and to Britain? Aſk, if thoſe Weſt-India iſlands were doubled in extent and produce, if North-America would not thereby increaſe and double in value; its trade with theſe iſlands be doubled, as well as its trade with Britain. Look into any part of North-America, and you ſhall find gold and ſilver not frequent; but look into any of the ſugar iſlands, and you will find what you purchaſe in England for a penny, you give ſixpence for there, in many articles.

As thoſe ſugar iſlands conſume near as much of the produce of Great-Britain as America itſelf does, ſo the encreaſe of theſe iſlands, or the acquiring more territory there, muſt not only encreaſe the conſumption of the Britiſh produce, with the trade and ſhipping from thence; but alſo the conſumption of the American produce, with the trade and ſhipping from the Weſt-Indies to America, and from America to England: thus thoſe iſlands being the common medium of import and export from Britain and America, it becomes the intereſt of both to acquire as much territory there as they poſſibly can, until we have what may anſwer the exports of Britain and America both, which is far from being the caſe at preſent; 30,000 acres in the Weſt-Indies would encreaſe the value of Britain and America both, more than 300,000 acres either in Europe or America could poſſibly do. It muſt appear then paſt diſpute, that nothing can be more beneficial for Great-Britain and America jointly, than the encreaſe of the ſugar iſlands; it is there we are too weak; it is there the juſt proportion to be maintained amongſt the three fails, and is defective for want of more territory, and calls aloud for us to retain Guadaloupe, if in our power to do it: an iſland pregnant with all the advantages and wealth we ſo greedily hunt after; an iſland that will produce more ſugar, more coffee, and more cotton than all the iſlands we have put together. I am ſenſible I do not exaggerate, when I ſay, that Guadaloupe and its

its dependencies can, and will in a very few years, after being united to Britain, yield above 150,000 hogſheads of ſugar annually, with rum or molaſſes in proportion; that its conſumption of the produce of Britain is, and will continue to be very great.

I ſhall not here enlarge upon all the other profitable things this iſland can ſend home, as I am ſenſible what I have ſaid of the ſugar, is ſo far above the notions of Guadaloupe, that have been induſtriouſly ſpread through England, that the ſame pains will be taken to diſcredit it; but I muſt here ſay to my country, that I have conſidered it with attention; that I have been thought by the ſugar planters in our iſlands, not defective in the knowledge of vegetation and culture of the ground: and that I have convinced many of them of ſome miſtakes in their practice. But I do not reſt my aſſertions there, I have converſed with many of the beſt ſugar planters of our other iſlands, who have looked over Guadaloupe carefully and attentively with the ſame view, who have been many years planters in theſe iſlands we have, and lived in Guadaloupe ſince we had any footing there, and the opinions of thoſe gentlemen were conſiderably above what I have ſaid, and not below it.

From whom can England know the value of Guadaloupe, but from ſuch, and who can ſo properly diſpel thoſe clouds of darkneſs and error that have been ſo induſtriouſly ſpread round it? Where can the truth be known, or objects viewed, but on the ſpot? Will a citizen of London, who never once ſaw a ſugar plantation in his life, know better what Guadaloupe can produce, than thoſe who have long practiſed in ſugar plantations, and viewed almoſt every ſpot of the iſland with an attention proper for qualifying them to judge of it? Or will the French records of the export of 70,000 hogſheads annually, have no weight, when they

had few people who underſtood the culture of the ſugar plant, and not half ſufficiency of negroes to work the ground? Do the people of England know, That Marie Galante is very near the extent of Antigua, without one mountain in it; that the extenſive country of Grandterre has not a mountain, or an acre of bad ſoil in it; that Guadaloupe has only one ridge of mountains nigh Baſſeterre, very beneficial for graſs and rains to all the country around? Will a farmer in England ſay, that two or three of them together cannot judge of a neighbouring farm what grain it may produce with ordinary culture, or what rent it ſhould ſet for? Thus much briefly for Guadaloupe at preſent.

But now to apply it to the argument, ſince theſe three parties, Britain, North-America, and the Weſt-Indies, are ſo inſeparably linked in one trade and intereſt, and that the Weſt-Indies, one of the three, is univerſally allowed to be ſo far deficient in extent of territory as thereby to confine and limit the trade and profit of the whole; does it not follow, that ſuch an acquiſition as Guadaloupe, to double the ſtrength and utility of that weakeſt party, and bring it nearer to an equality with the other two, ſo as to anſwer more of their demands and exports, I ſay, will not ſuch an acquiſition double the value, trade, and wealth of all the three; ſo eſſentially and inſeparably linked together in one unity of trade. The thing is clearer than light itſelf, if I may be allowed the expreſſion, and yet people will be at ſo much pains to darken that light, only to lead their countrymen into a ſnare.

I ſhall not take upon me to ſay what we ſhould keep or what we ſhould give up; but I am pretty certain we have a great deal in our hands at preſent, and I have full confidence in our miniſtry, that they who have ſo prudently and ſo vigorouſly carried on the war, and thereby manifeſted to the world ſo diſtinguiſhed a ſenſe of

of the true intereſt of their country, will make a peace conformable to theſe maxims, and ſuitable to the intereſt of Great-Britain.

But we have at all times a French faction feſtering in our own bowels, particularly at ſuch a juncture. If they cannot divert the war from the ſugar iſlands, where France can be ſo mortally wounded, nor blind the nation as to the value of Guadaloupe, they talk next of the honour of a diſintereſted peace. Are we to have the honour to neglect our own intereſt, and prefer that of France, that the treaty of Utrecht may no longer bluſh? Has this any other meaning but to ſave the French in all ſhapes? Was it not our intereſt that engaged us in the war? Are we now to diſcard it, and throw it out of the queſtion? Are we to act contrary to our intereſt or not, after we have carried on the war with a ſucceſs beyond our moſt ſanguine wiſhes and expectations, and where the vaſt ſums of money ſo chearfully paid by the nation for carrying on that war, can be as little paralleled in hiſtory, as the victories it produced? Are we then to talk of no indemnification for all that expence,——for all thoſe vaſt treaſures we have beſtowed for five or ſix years paſt? A ſum of money with which Jugurtha could have purchaſed the whole Roman empire in its grandeur. Are we deſtined for ever to fight knight-errant battles in all the quarters of the world, without any view of intereſt or advantage to ourſelves? For my own part, I have always looked upon Machiavel, or cardinal Richlieu, as much better patterns to follow in ſtate affairs than Don Quixote: and I ſhall ſtill hope, that after ſo juſt and neceſſary a war, followed with ſo much ſucceſs and honour, we ſhall have a ſuitable indemnification for the blood and treaſure we have ſpent in doing ourſelves juſtice. What private man in England, engaged in a law-ſuit, after he has obtained a decree in his favour, but aſks and receives coſts of ſuit?

I hope theſe wolves in ſheeps cloathing will be detected, and no longer liſtened to, as I think it is made very plain, that when they argue for acquiring Canada, and giving up Guadaloupe, or when they talk of a diſintereſted peace, they have neither the intereſt of Britain or North-America in their view. It is plainly the intereſt of France they aim at, joined perhaps with ſome ſmall advantages to the ſugar iſlands we have; but from theſe deſtructive principles, how warmly do they ſtruggle againſt the trade, wealth, grandeur and honour of their native country (if they are Britiſh) I hope is now made very clear to the world.

What may be in our power to keep from France at a peace, I ſhall not be ſo preſuming as to determine; but I will take upon me to affirm theſe two things, firſt, that a diſintereſted peace, if I underſtand the meaning of it, not to think of our own intereſt, but to give up every thing; and keep no proper indemnification for our expence in ſo juſt a war, would be a peace that the nation might have reaſon to beſtow a much harſher name upon than diſintereſted, and will not fail to do it. And,

Secondly, That if Canada and Guadaloupe were put in our option, to chuſe the one and reject the other, no true Britiſh ſubject, who knew any thing of the true intereſt of his country, or any North-American, would heſitate a moment in making the choice of Guadaloupe, and rejecting Canada: and I know many worthy gentlemen in the ſugar iſlands we have, who I am ſure, would frankly and generouſly give up all ſelfiſh views of a little private gain, for ſuch an acquiſition as Guadaloupe, which they are ſenſible muſt add ſo much to the trade, wealth and dignity of their country.

I am, *&c.*

LETTER III.

In perils amongſt falſe Brethren.

SIR,

IN my two preceding Letters I gave you my thoughts upon the ſubject of Guadaloupe, with the ordinary freedom of a letter, and without ſtudying much method or order; but ſometimes anſwering abſurd arguments, and at other times ſtating the caſe in its true light; I ſhall therefore go on in the ſame manner, and obſerve, that ſince the beginning of the laſt century the affairs of Europe have undergone almoſt a total change, in every ſtate, leſs or more, in their trade, policy and government; in a great meaſure owing to the new diſcovered world of America and the Weſt-Indies. It would be in vain for me to trace its progreſs, or to ſhew the natural cauſes that produced theſe alterations, as it could be no way deciſive of the point in iſſue; it may be ſufficient for my purpoſe to notice, that the trade of Great-Britain is now in a more flouriſhing ſtate than ever it was, and more ſo than any of its neighbours.

That

That three-fourths of the trade and ſhipping of Great-Britain at preſent, conſiſts in her trade to the Weſt-Indies and North-America; the great conſumption of the manufactures and produce of Great-Britain both in the Weſt-Indies and North-America, not only employs ſuch a number of tradeſmen in England, but alſo furniſhes buſineſs for ſo many ſhips and ſeamen in carrying thoſe things to the ſeveral markets of this new world, and bringing back to England the produce of theſe countries, which ſhe does or ſhould retail to the reſt of Europe. And, Secondly, the trade betwixt America and the Weſt-Indies in their reciprocal wants, now become very conſiderable. Our trade up the Straights and to the Levant, is generally allowed to be much upon the decline, and to the North, in exports eſpecially, greatly diminiſhed; our trade with Spain, once the great ſupport of the nation, rather againſt us ſince the laſt war, when, for the intereſt of the houſe of Auſtria, we not only gave up Cape-Briton, but even our South-ſea ſhip; and yet our trade more flouriſhing than ever, and our naval ſtrength greater, this can only proceed from our ſkilful culture of the few ſugar iſlands we have, and the fine countries of America, from their increaſe of people and their great demands of the produce and manufactures of the mother-country.

As England very early felt the benefits of this new world, and found greater returns, and more gain from her trade with America than any where elſe; ſo ſhe turned her thoughts moſt that way, and the other branches of her trade in Europe being leſs attended to, came to decline, and be more diverted into other channels. What muſt be her ſtate then, and to what a deplorable ſtate muſt ſhe ſink, if ſhe loſes this trade to America and the Weſt-Indies; which I am afraid will too ſoon be the caſe, if this giddineſs of the people,

people, this madneſs that reigns after North-America, be not in ſome meaſure extinguiſhed, or at leaſt moderated by the prudence and judgment of ſo great a monarch as fills the throne, and ſo patriot a miniſtry as now conducts the reins of government. My aſſertion I prove thus:

That our poſſeſſions in North-America, ſuch as we have an undoubted title to, when they are properly ſecured to us by treaty and a well eſtabliſhed barrier, are rather greater than we are able to manage to any good purpoſe. I have already ſaid that they are of much greater extent of territory than Great-Britain, better and more variety of climates, and even now as they ſtand, juſt emerging out of infancy, they have already more produce than they can diſpoſe of. The ſugar iſlands we have are not able to conſume one half of the lumber, flour, biſcuit, rice, and other produce of America. From which, in my former letters, I drew this plain conſequence, that acquiring more ſugar iſlands was chiefly the intereſt of North-America as well as Britain: now I ſhall ſhow it in the following light. That as North-America, our ſettlements there I mean, are ſo faſt increaſing in people as to double their number once in twenty years [ſo ſay the writers for Canada,] then it ſurely follows, that they muſt abate of their application in cultivating the ground, the produce of which is to lie a dead weight upon their hands, uſeleſs and unconſumed. They muſt naturally put thoſe ſpare people to learn arts and trades; to make cloaths, ſhoes, ſtockings, ſhirts, &c. ſmiths, carpenters, braziers, and all the trades that flouriſh in England: after this is accompliſhed, of what utility will they be of to Great-Britain? What can they want from her in all times thereafter? Thus the greateſt benefits of North-America fails you at once: but this is not all, for then ſhe will rival you in the Weſt-Indies: America will furniſh thoſe iſlands with every thing that

now

now comes from England, and can do it cheaper; ſo that the trade and grandeur of Great-Britain ſoon comes to an end, when America and the Weſt-Indies are no longer of any uſe to her. This fatal cataſtrophe, which no power on earth could bring upon her by open force, ſhe procures to herſelf with her eyes open; and by the advice of falſe, unnatural, and corrupted children, who can proſtitute thoſe great talents given them, of eloquence and perſuaſion, to the deſtruction, ruin, and murder of the mother who gave them birth, and to tear open thoſe tender maternal breaſts that ſuckled them.

O tempora! O mores!

Whereas, if we would now embrace this ſunſhine of proſperity, this favourable opportunity that offers to inlarge our poſſeſſions in the Weſt-Indies, to acquire more of the ſugar iſlands, neutral as well as French, America might thereby be kept much longer in dependance upon Britain, by affording her more conſumption for her produce, and diverting her attention from trades and manufactures, to follow agriculture, and a prudent attention to every circumſtance that can ſecure her dependance upon Britain, to eſtabliſh certain and diſtinct bounds and limits to the French poſſeſſions and ours in that country, to reſtrain the French from any property upon, or communication with the ſea-coaſt, and to keep up a political jealouſy of the French in North-America, and at the ſame time to avoid any real danger.

Is it poſſible to imagine that ſo extenſive and ſo fertile a country as North-America, which we would now graſp at, can long remain dependant upon, and ſubject to Great-Britain, without ſome jealouſies raiſed and maintained amongſt themſelves, both of internal and external objects upon their own continent; in which

the

the French ſettlements in Canada, properly limited, may become very inſtrumental? Thus by a prudent and timely encreaſe of your territory or poſſeſſions in the Weſt-Indies, you not only double the trade and ſhipping of Great-Britain, but you bind America longer and firmer to her dependance upon England, by eſtabliſhing a more equal balance betwixt America and the Weſt-Indies, where we are too weak in every ſenſe, and every knowing man's opinion.

As to this favourite ſcheme of colonizing, let us look backwards and ſee what attempts the Grecians or Romans made that way. We ſhall find few precedents there. The Grecians indeed ſettled ſome few ſmall colonies on the coaſts of Aſia, and left them as often a ſhameful prey to the Perſians. In modern times Spain is almoſt the only inſtance we can find to caſt our eyes upon: Spain, in the beginning of the laſt century, was the dread of Europe: ſlavery and univerſal monarchy frightened the reſt of the world: ſhe had naval ſtrength to cover and protect her conqueſts of the new world, and could ſpare fleets and armies ſufficient to make England tremble in its boaſted zenith, the reign of Elizabeth. Was not that enterprize baffled and diſappointed by the winds and tempeſts, more than by the united fleets of her and her merchants. But behold the fatal conſequences of ſuch pernicious meaſures in a ſtate. Spain graſped at conqueſts in a foreign country in the new world, ſo far above the extent and ability of the mother-country that ſhe diſpeopled herſelf: and though ſhe conquered theſe countries, the inexhauſtible fountain of thoſe precious mettles that the world hunt after with ſo inſatiable an appetite, yet ſhe gradually declined from thoſe miſtaken maxims to the ſtate ſhe is now in.

Are we then ſo infatuated that we can neither take advice nor take warning? Are not we the only people upon

upon earth, except Spain, that ever thought of eſtabliſhing a colony ten times more extenſive than our own; of richer ſoils and more variety of climates, productive of every individual thing that our country can yield, and yet fancy, when it comes to maturity, it will ſtill depend upon us, or be of any kind of advantage to us: on the contrary, if it does not become our maſter, it muſt ſoon, very ſoon, ſtand our powerful rival in all the branches of our trade.

It is a maxim now eſtabliſhed beyond diſpute, that Britain cannot acquire territory upon the continent of Europe to any ſort of advantage, but rather to her own detriment, as all her liberty, wealth, and happineſs, are, in a great meaſure, owing to her being an iſland diſengaged from the dangers and quarrels of her neighbours. I flatter myſelf I have in theſe three letters made it as plain that ſhe cannot acquire more property upon the continent of America, without more danger; and that ſhe has more there already than ſhe can manage to any profitable purpoſe.

It is in the ſugar iſlands only, that ſhe can acquire territory to her own advantage, and it is there ſhe is moſt deficient; one acre in the ſugar iſlands is of more real advantage to her than a thouſand in America. It is from theſe iſlands that the greateſt part of her trade and wealth flow. As iſlands they are detached like herſelf from the reſt of the world, and muſt always be dependent upon her, or ſome other ſuch power, while time is, as they produce nothing that the mother-country does; they muſt always be clothed from head to foot by the mother-country, fed from thence in the moſt material articles, and every houſe furniſhed from that quarter in all its wants, tables, chairs, beds, cabinets, mirrors, locks, hinges, table and bed-linens; in ſhort, every thing muſt come from home; nor can they ever be in any other ſituation, as the expence of living,

living, together with the warmneſs of the climate, renders it impoſſible to manufacture them there ſo cheap as you can bring them from England or North-America; therefore they can never ſubſiſt by themſelves without you; muſt always remain dependent, and continue the fountain of great wealth to the mother-country.

If this be the true ſtate of the caſe, as undoubtedly it is, what language, what expreſſions can a man uſe to give a lively repreſentation to the world of that fatality of ſentiment, that diſtraction of mind, or that corruption of heart that can endeavour ſo warmly to miſlead their country; not only from acquiring more territory amongſt ſuch valuable iſlands, where ſhe can only make acquiſitions to her advantage, but even to give up what ſhe is actually in poſſeſſion of, and hunt her own ruin through the deſarts of America? I confeſs it is above my reach if I keep within the bounds of decency, therefore I leave it to the reader's own fancy, that I may avoid the imputation of railing more than arguing.

Let us now caſt our eyes upon the French trade and ſhipping. What a rapid progreſs they made from the treaty of Utrecht, the captors of their ſhips in this and the laſt war gives us ſome light: thoſe who took a view of the French ports before the war was declared, were ſurprized at the vaſt number of ſhipping belonging to every port in the channel, and up the bay of Biſcay. Were they employed in the trade to Canada or the Weſt-Indies? The captors themſelves, and every account publiſhed of them, ſhows that it was the Weſt-India trade that moſtly employed them. This great increaſe of the French trade ſince the peace of Utrecht, was entirely owing to the French penetration, and our fatal indolence and ſecurity from that period which would not allow us to perceive the pro-

 greſs

greſs they made, and the ſugar iſlands they poſſeſſed, nor never make the leaſt attempt to enlarge our own poſſeſſions or territories there: What were the conſequences? Why, in the period of Britiſh indolence, lethargy or ſecurity, France, who could not at the treaty of Utrecht ſupply themſelves with the ſmall quantity of ſugars they conſumed, now conſume a great deal, and ſerve moſt of the markets of Europe to a great extent: and we, who at that period exported a good deal of ſugar, could not, at the breaking out of the preſent war, ſerve ourſelves with that article; and Ireland then imported about fourteen thouſand hogſheads of ſugar from Portugal, and other places annually, from a want of that commodity of our own.

It was in this branch the ſhipping trade and naval ſtrength of France made ſuch progreſs: Who then could ſo audaciouſly aſſert to us we had ſugar iſlands enough already? Who but thoſe proprietors of eſtates in the few ſugar iſlands we have? If it is aſſerted of them, it has ſome foundation in truth, becauſe as to them individually, they have enough; more would hurt the exorbitant prices they have long demanded from their country, much higher than any other market in Europe. But if it is ſaid that we have ſugar iſlands enough for the intereſt of the nation, there is no ſhadow of truth in it; I flatter myſelf I have a title to ſay ſo from what is contained in this and my former letters upon that ſubject; but I ſhall puſh the truth a little further from facts that cannot be concealed, from evidence as clear as the ſun at noon-day.

Is there a man in Barbadoes, in Antigua, St. Kitts, Montſeratt, or all the iſlands around, who will not own that theſe iſlands belonging to Great-Britain are all of them cultivated to the higheſt pitch? that they have more hands than they can employ for want of ter-

territory; that many people of late years who came over from Britain or Ireland, poſſibly indentured, or at a venture, and have by frugality and good behaviour in a few years acquired ten, fifteen or twenty negroes of their own, yet could not get a bit of ſoil to work upon or employ theſe hands from want of territory, and were thereby neceſſitated to go to Dutch, Daniſh, French or neutral iſlands, for ground to employ thoſe hands and ſubſiſt themſelves. Is it poſſible to think that ſuch people could ſhake off the honeſt Engliſh prejudice in favour of their country, to neglect the Engliſh liberty and property, and go to ſeek ſubſiſtence where both theſe bleſſings were more precarious, if they had not been driven to it by fatal neceſſity, the want of territory of our own to employ them? No man that belongs to the ſugar iſlands we have, will be hardy enough to deny the facts, as they are ſo well known, though they may be concealed from the generality of the people of England, that the Daniſh ſettlements of St. Croix, and others, as well as the Dutch ſettlements upon the coaſt of South-America, where ſugar makes ſuch progreſs, are almoſt intirely peopled from ours, and by thoſe only who could not at any rate obtain ſoil or poſſeſſion to work upon in our own iſlands: nay, ſome of thoſe adventurers have gone from the other iſlands to Jamaica itſelf, before they have determined to go elſewhere, and after a few years trial were ſenſible that all the grounds which could be cultivated with any advantage there, were done already; unleſs what belonged to ſome over-grown eſtates, who chooſed to let it lay as it was rather than be at the expence of culture, which might in ſome degree leſſen the value of what was ſo cultivated already.

Are we then to be for ever ſo fatally blinded to our intereſt, as to neceſſitate our own people to go away

and inrich all our neighbours, nay our enemies, with their ſuperior ſkill in culture; and people the richeſt ſpots of the world for others, not for ourſelves? What a fatal inſenſibility is this, when it is demonſtratively plain, that we want nothing but ſome more of the ſugar iſlands to make us great; nay, to make us the greateſt people this day upon earth; and that it is now in our power to eſtabliſh that greatneſs by one eaſy acquiſition of more territory there. The riches of thoſe ſugar iſlands beyond any places we have or know, is fully demonſtrated at London itſelf, where ſo many gentlemen can, from no great extent of territory in thoſe iſlands, live at London in ſplendour, and rival the nobility in equipage and expence. I am far from repining at it, I am glad to ſee it, and wiſh to have more of thoſe iſlands, and many more ſuch people at London. It is they only that would confine our poſſeſſions there, and limit the number, that they may ſhine the brighter themſelves; but it moſt plainly demonſtrates to the world the value of thoſe iſlands, and convince you that we cannot have too many of them.

I was myſelf an eye-witneſs of that fatality of my country I complain of, when the accounts came to London of the capitulation of Guadaloupe. How was it received? Rather like a misfortune than a bleſſing, as a fruitleſs and miſtaken expedition; not ſo much as the huzzas of a mob, but one univerſal ridicule of the terms of the capitulation in every coffee-houſe, to divert their attention from the importance of the thing; they were prepared for this from the time it was known that the fleet and army had left Martinico, and the troops landed in the larger and richer iſland of Guadaloupe. I decline dwelling any longer upon ſo diſagreeable a ſubject, as to run over all the inſenſibility, and infatuation I was witneſs of; I ſhall only ſay, in this manner was received the accounts

counts of a conqueſt the greateſt and moſt important England ever made ſince the reduction of Ireland; of a great deal more conſequence than any thing they acquired by all her bloody and expenſive wars at the end of the laſt century, and the firſt twelve years of this; how diſcouraging then muſt it have been to ſuch a miniſtry as we are bleſt with, when they had ſhewn ſo diſtinguiſhed a ſenſe of the intereſt of their country; ſo firm a reſolution to eſtabliſh her ſuperiority over France upon the moſt ſolid and national footing, to find it ſpurned at, and their country blinded to her intereſt? Might not this be one reaſon, amongſt many others, that ſo fatal a blow to the wealth, trade, and naval ſtrength of France, was no further puſhed?

I ſhall turn too warm if I continue this ſubject any longer, therefore I proceed to mention one argument uſed by the more moderate for relinquiſhing Guadaloupe, and it is thus; That we may depend upon its being given up to France, becauſe the merchants of England, who are the beſt judges of its national intereſt, have ſhewn no anxiety about Guadaloupe, or expreſſed any inclination to have it kept. To which I anſwer, Firſt, that I cannot admit it, nay, I could venture to put the whole fate of it upon the opinions of the merchants, that the acquiring more territory in the ſugar iſlands would increaſe the wealth, trade, and ſhipping of Great-Britain more than any thing elſe. I will not ſay I would riſque it upon the opinions of thoſe that are proprietors of our ſugar iſlands ſingly, though the thing is ſo ſelf-evident, that I believe I might do it with ſafety. But, Secondly, I can by no means admit that the merchants are the beſt judges of national meaſures, I ſhall not ſay they are juſt the worſt, but ſure I am they are far from being the beſt; nor can it be otherwiſe; a merchant's buſineſs, as ſuch, is to watch the preſent times, and improve every

circumſtance to his own gain: his thoughts, ſtudy, and reflections, as a merchant, are confined to a few years, the ſhort period he exiſts in, very rarely to look above three years backwards or forwards; from good intelligence to know when to purchaſe and when to ſell ſtocks; if a war is likely to happen in the north to ſell ſtocks, which muſt fall, and purchaſe iron and naval ſtores, which muſt riſe in their prices; to diſcern when French cloaths, hats, and other ſtuffs, from the fatality of war, can be purchaſed at very low prices, and vended for our own with very high profits. Even this favourite continent of America, the merchants there can eaſily diſcover, that their lumber, their wheat, biſcuit, rice, and ſalt-fiſh, can give a much better price in the French iſlands than in ours; that the French ſugars and molaſſes, from the dangers of navigation, ſells at ſo low rates, that they carry moſt of their lumber and proviſions to St. Domingo, and carry the French ſugars and molaſſes to America, with much more profit than they can do from our iſlands; not only what ſerves themſelves, but ſo as to import more ſugars to England than any iſland ſhe has can afford, beſides what ſugars America ſends of late years to Holland and up the Straights without ever coming to England at all. If rightly informed, I may appeal to the cuſtom-houſes in England for the truth of the importation of ſugars from North-America; and the cuſtom-houſes of our own ſugar iſlands can ſhew how little there was or has been ſhipped for America a year or two paſt. I have no buſineſs to dip deeper into thoſe affairs at preſent, further than this; that it is a ſtrong demonſtration how quickly this favourite people of North-America can think of ſhifting for themſelves, independent of Britain. But to return to the merchants, their heads and thoughts are entirely fixed upon the preſent times, where and how to make the greateſt gain to themſelves, in which ſome can take more liberties than others.

But

But how widely different is this from thoſe who are formed to conduct the helm of ſtate, thoſe who muſt ſtudy the philoſophy and policy of government, which teaches them to look back as far as authentic hiſtories can conduct them with certainty, to mark the cauſes of the riſe and decline of antient ſtates, to ſtudy the paſſions and deſigns of the great men of thoſe times, which were productive of ſuch events; to compare the paſſions and operations of the human mind in the preſent times, with thoſe that are paſt; to carry on thoſe obſervations to future times, to mark where the ſtate may be ſhip-wrecked, and avoid thoſe dangers; to obſerve what may aggrandize her in future times, and take meaſures to ſecure that, before her cotemporaries or enemies can diſcover the danger, or prevent the effect.

When theſe two, the merchant and the miniſter, are thus briefly compared, how widely different are they; in reality as wide almoſt as eaſt from weſt; let us not deceive ourſelves then in theſe notions, that the merchants are, or can be, the beſt judges of the philoſophy of government, or the intereſt of a ſtate, nor let us be ſo unjuſt to them as to interpret their modeſt ſilence to a proof of their condemning meaſures ſo much for the intereſt of the nation in general, which they cannot but approve of. On the contrary, let us more juſtly think that their ſilence proceeds from that full confidence they have, and all of us ought to maintain, in the capacity and integrity of thoſe miniſters who conduct the wheels of government, that they can judge the intereſt of the nation and follow it more ſteadily than we can direct, or even wiſh. I eſteem the merchants as the moſt uſeful body of people in the nation; at the ſame time I am very happy to think that we have much better and abler pilots to conduct the ſtate.

I ſhall, in the laſt place, take notice of another motive often mentioned with more appearance of judgment, and it is thus; That poſſibly all our conqueſts muſt be reſtored to France: it depends intirely upon the fate of the war in Germany, the fates of Hanover, and the king of Pruſſia. This favours a good deal more of modeſty, and in ſome meaſure may be true, but not univerſally ſo. As it appears a little dark, let us bring it to the light and examine it. We are ſurely under the ſtrongeſt ties to protect Hanover that can poſſibly occur. It is the hereditary dominions of ſo good a king, attacked only in our quarrel, they have made a noble ſtand againſt the power of France for three years paſt, and acquired great honour to themſelves as well as to the prince that conducted them. But they have been as powerfully ſupported by us as any people could be, with money, proviſions, forage, artillery, and Britiſh auxiliaries: and, bleſſed be God, France has made no impreſſion as yet; the cauſe of liberty proſpers there. If all the power of France could not penetrate into Hanover theſe three campaigns paſt, have we any reaſon to dread ſhe can do it next year, when her ſtrength is declined, and our capacity of ſupporting Hanover become greater? Will France have plate to coin every year? Do not let us betray too viſibly thoſe daſtardly ſentiments that have no real foundation: that argument can only be uſed by thoſe who wiſh it were ſo.

And as for the king of Pruſſia, I have as great eſteem for him as any man ſhould have: he has made the moſt glorious ſtand againſt the united force of the greateſt empires we know for four years paſt, as muſt make him the theme of future ages, as well as the preſent. His magnanimity, joined with ſuch quickneſs in judging, and ſuch rapidity in executing, affords reſources in himſelf that cannot be ſo obvious

to

to leſs exalted minds: his victories have always been obtained with far inferior numbers: the bravery and diſcipline of his troops no way abated, and the greatneſs of his own mind remains unſhaken: why then may not the ſame cauſes, under the direction of the ſame Providence, produce the ſame effects, while we ſupply him with the ſame power of money?

Nevertheleſs, to view where the argument points againſt us, give me leave to ſuppoſe that the empires of Germany and Ruſſia ſhould get the advantage of him, which heaven avert. Theſe two powers have long carried on a war againſt that great prince, from cauſes neither founded in reaſon, intereſt, or policy, but from the moſt unruly paſſions: though the motives may be low, yet they muſt be more head-ſtrong and irreſiſtable than when they are governed by reaſon or intereſt. Can we then ſuppoſe that the queen of Hungary, after ſhe has gained ſo favourite a point, will all at once abandon theſe paſſions that were too ſtrong to be controuled by her honour and her intereſt both? Will our aggrandiſing France be a ſtronger motive to her than her own intereſt was? on the contrary, this ſeeming union betwixt the houſes of Bourbon and Auſtria, muſt appear to the reſt of the world as a temporary phrenzy, or an alliance betwixt a fox and a lamb. Her memory muſt ſtill ſuggeſt to her, that France was always the hereditary foe of her family, and muſt continue ſo; therefore our aggrandiſing France muſt be obſerved by her with a jealous eye and unſatisfied mind: and can never be a motive for her to reſtore the king of Pruſſia, whoſe ruin ſhe has purſued, almoſt to her own deſtruction, in oppoſition to her intereſt and honour. Or can we ſurmiſe to ourſelves that Ruſſia will be moved to correct thoſe head-ſtrong paſſions, and to reſtore the king of Pruſ-

ſia from our aggrandiſing France, on whom ſhe has no viſible dependance. For my part, I own this argument drawn from the ſituation of Germany or the king of Pruſſia, ſeems both dark and unconcluſive to me: I make no ſort of doubt but France will join with you at any time you pleaſe to ruin the houſe of Auſtria, and ſee you with pleaſure waſte as much blood and treaſure for that purpoſe as you have done in former times to ſave her.

But if Britain looks upon herſelf as ſet apart to be the guardian of the liberties of Europe, ſhe muſt at the ſame time look upon France as the vulture lying always in wait to devour them: let her act then with that ſteadineſs and magnanimity becoming ſo great a people; let her conſider, that while ſhe retains the ſuperiority over France, now put in her hands, the liberties of Europe are ſecured; a few members may ſuffer ſome temporary inconveniencies, but they may be comforted that the duration is ſhort, and their deliverance at hand, while Britain holds the reigns. How will all the ſtates of Germany in their turns bleſs that ſteadineſs in the councils of Great-Britain, that could not be diverted from maintaining and eſtabliſhing her ſuperiority over France; the only thing that can in all times to come afford certain relief to the oppreſſed. Whereas, if ſhe is tempted or betrayed to give up this long wiſhed-for ſuperiority (that is now viſibly in her hands) for any motives whatever, or any temporary conveniencies to Germany; her own liberties, as well as thoſe of Germany, muſt ever after be precarious and uncertain; becauſe Britain had not firmneſs to hold faſt that balance ſo clearly put in her hands. Let her now act with ſteadineſs becoming herſelf, and think for her own good, for the good of Germany, as well as the reſt of the world: almoſt every ſtate in Europe is deeply intereſted in her reſolutions upon this

this great and important event; but if Britain ſhould ſtand doubting and trembling to betray and give up the liberties of Europe at once, by reſtoring the naval ſtrength and wealth of France, centered in the ſugar iſlands, for any momentary or imaginary diſtreſſes whatever, how unlike would it be, to that magnanimity and fortitude of the Roman people we ſo much affect to imitate and equal; who could both project and execute the ruin and deſtruction of Carthage itſelf, while Hannibal was yet thundering ſo nigh the gates of Rome?

But I am afraid I have ſaid too much, and wandered out of my depth from honeſt motives more than from inadvertency; therefore I ſhall now conclude with reſuming what I think is proved, that the acquiring more territory in Europe, or the continent of America, muſt certainly be fatal to us: that the Weſt-Indies is the only place we can acquire territory in, to any ſort of advantage: that it is in our power to do it eaſily at this juncture: that ſuch acquiſitions in the Weſt-Indies muſt raiſe our wealth and naval ſtrength above France, or any power on earth, and much above what it is.

We ſee ourſelves bleſſed with a great monarch and an able miniſtry, with a brave army and invincible fleets; that victory has already put in our hands a curb to check the power of France, and maintain the liberties of Europe: I hope we ſhall not throw it away tamely or with timidity. For though ſome falſe brethren, ſome unnatural children, have ariſen amongſt us, endeavouring to blaſt this fair harveſt, and miſlead us into error and ruin: yet I hope their artifices are too thin to darken our eyes, and the meaſures of our miniſtry too ſteady to be ſhaken or miſled. If our debt ſhould be augmenting, ſo is our trade and wealth increaſing with more rapidity;

pidity; our abilities to carry on the war rising daily, while that of our common enemy sinks visibly to all the world, below even the power of defending any of her colonies.——Where can we hesitate?

Basseterre,
October 26, 1760.

I am, &c.

LET-

LETTER IV.

SIR,

IT appears to me, that any people or nation muſt be happy in themſelves, and reſpectable to their neighbours, in proportion to their numbers and the induſtry they are employed in. It is induſtry that is real wealth, and the abounding with the neceſſaries of life makes the people happy at home, while they enjoy the liberty and ſecurity of poſſeſſing what their induſtry produces. Induſtry can never be univerſal in any country where liberty and property are not well ſecured and protected, as no man will be induſtrious where he is not ſure of enjoying the fruits and profits of that induſtry and labour; ſo that liberty and induſtry are cloſe companions, and generally go hand in hand; induſtry then is real wealth, not gold and ſilver, which are only the ſhadows or repreſentations of wealth and induſtry. Gold and ſilver can never be retained in any country after induſtry is gone, no more than you can retain the ſhadow after the ſubſtance is removed. Agri-

culture

culture at firſt ſpreads or diffuſes induſtry more univerſally over a country than any thing elſe can do; the more that country improves in the knowledge and practice of agriculture, the neceſſaries of life muſt become the cheaper, and the more materials afforded for trades and manufactures, the more theſe laſt abound the greater demand you have for ſhipping and commerce to carry ſuch productions round the reſt of the world, and barter them for the other things you want to carry home, or vend to other countries.

Thus you raiſe a new body of manufacturers, and a new body of ſailors and merchants; it is from thoſe the wealth, ſtrength, and grandeur of a nation ariſes, more than from ſuch as follow the plough, though the laſt are the firſt ſprings from which the others are moved. If a nation have neither trades, manufactures, ſhipping, nor commerce, it can never be formidable to its neighbours, though that nation ſhould underſtand both the theory and practice of agriculture and vegetation better than any people upon earth yet does; the manufactures, ſhipping, and commerce of a nation, are its real wealth, and what gives it moſt weight among all its neighbours; if that ſhipping and commerce is founded and ſubſiſts principally upon the productions of that country, then it ſtands upon the moſt ſolid foundation, but if it depends entirely upon other nations, or being the carriers for other people, it is then more precarious, and can laſt only until thoſe ſtates become wiſe enough, or populous enough to be their own carriers.

It follows ſurely from theſe principles, that a nation can never be too attentive to agriculture, either in the infancy or maturity of that nation, becauſe from

from it ariſes plenty of the neceſſaries of life at home; to maintain numbers of people induſtriouſly employed in trades and manufactures, while thoſe afford buſineſs for the third ſet merchants and ſailors, which compleats both the internal and external ſtrength of a ſtate; that the legiſlative power can never be too attentive in promoting ſuch induſtry, and directing it to its proper objects by well adjuſted laws and regulations for that purpoſe; nor can the executive power be too circumſpect in putting theſe laws and regulations in execution, with the utmoſt care, candour, and impartiality. Who then can agree with the author of a late pamphlet, intitled, "The Intereſt of Great-Britain conſidered," when he aſſerts that trades and manufactures, with commerce, the natural conſequence of the two, are the poverty of a country? Whether he means that they ariſe from the poverty of a country, or that they are themſelves the poverty of that country, the aſſertion is equally erroneous; for I have ſhewn before that they muſt ariſe from plenty of rivers, and plenty of people induſtriouſly employed, and ſecured from tyranny, which are the real and natural ſprings of the ſtrength and wealth of any ſtate, the ſeeds from which manufactures and commerce ſpring, and therefore they are the greateſt wealth and ſtrength of a nation.

It may appear ſurpriſing that a man of eloquence, learning, and education, ſhould allow himſelf to deviate into ſuch abſurdities as aſſert, that trades, manufactures, and commerce, either ariſe from poverty, or are themſelves the poverty of a ſtate.

When he thinks ſo, it is natural enough to attempt the perſuading of us to give up thoſe valuable ſugar iſlands

iſlands that conſume ſo much of our manufactures, and employ ſo much of our ſhipping, I cannot ſay he is inconſiſtent with himſelf, as he ſo often aſſerts of the author of the Remarks. But I may venture to affirm, that he is in this very inconſiſtent with common ſenſe, and the common maxims of policy and government of this and the preceding ages of the world. I ſhall leave this ſingular author for a little, and make a few general obſervations upon the practice of eſtabliſhing foreign colonies.

It is generally allowed at all hands, and aſſerted by this author himſelf, that Great-Britain, properly cultivated, might maintain more than double the number of people it contains at preſent: it has been alſo the opinion of many great men, that the ſame number of people contracted into one half of the bounds of Great-Britain might be happier and more formidable than they are at preſent, as there would be a quicker intercourſe amongſt all its parts, and their united force more eaſily and quickly exerted; as this may ſeem a ſtrong argument againſt colonizing in any ſhape, I ſhall take no ſhare in it, being more inclined to think that colonies when they are eſtabliſhed from the principles of reaſon, good policy, and experience, may be very beneficial to a ſtate, and contribute much to her wealth, dignity, and influence over other nations.

To ſettle colonies in new countries, appears to be no more than creating of a new people to trade with the mother-country, under all the diſadvantages to them, and all the advantages to herſelf that ſhe pleaſes to impoſe upon this new child or vaſſal. It would naturally occur to any man, that the more frugal you are in exporting of your own people to this new colony ſo much the better, provided

vided the end be obtained, a few of the moſt uſeleſs of thoſe at home, with the addition of foreigners, will multiply faſter in a new country than any where elſe; but then the colony ought to be at a proper diſtance for the encouragement of navigation and ſailors, it ought to be alſo in the moſt different climates and ſoils from the mother-country, that its demands may be the greater, and its capacity of rivalling herein any of her productions become the leſs; that the colony produce principally thoſe things which the mother-country cannot, whereby navigation is increaſed; but above all, that the colonies be proportioned in ſome ſenſe to the mother-country, that the head may be able to manage all its members, and not the members too powerful for the head.

If this mother-country ſhould be an iſland, and ſenſible that the greateſt ſhare of the bleſſings ſhe enjoys are owing to her being an iſland, diſengaged from the quarrels of the continent, then any colonies ſhe could eſtabliſh upon any large continent, might have this diſadvantage of robbing her in a great meaſure of her natural and happy ſtate of being an iſland, and engaging her in continental quarrels, if the colonies ſhe were to eſtabliſh in this continent were ten times larger than the mother-country, in the ſame climates, richer ſoils, and productive of every individual thing the mother-country can yield, reaſon and experience would both call aloud, that it was deſtructive, that it was madneſs and folly, unleſs the principal view were to transfer the mother-country there, to make the new colonies the miſtreſs of the world, and the poor old mother made her ſlave.

But if this mother-country, ſuppoſed to be an iſland, had in her offer iſlands in plenty for to ſettle

colonies, ſmall iſlands would reaſonably appear to be the moſt uſeful colonies, they could be protected by her fleets, would engage her in no continental wars, are, like herſelf, detached from the reſt of the world; if theſe iſlands were at proper diſtances for the encouragement of ſhipping and ſailors, were ſituate in climates ſo oppoſite that they could produce nothing which the mother-country does; that they muſt be fed and clothed from the mother-country, and ſupplied in every thing from thence; that from their climate they muſt ever be dependant, and yet produce the moſt uſeful articles of luxury to the reſt of the world, which never can grow in the mother-country; that ſome of thoſe productions were both bulky and valuable, and ſhould require the more ſhipping, ſuch as ſugars, cotton, *&c.* that experience had taught and demonſtrated to her the value of ſuch iſlands, and that every ſtate which was wiſe enough to eſtabliſh colonies in thoſe iſlands grew wealthy at home, and potent at ſea, in proportion to the territory they poſſeſſed there; ſurely in that caſe there could be no room for heſitating, every ſound head and honeſt heart would call aloud for theſe iſland-colonies preferable to any thing elſe.

The application is exceeding obvious to Great-Britain as an iſland, with her colonies upon the continent of America, and the iſlands in the Weſt-Indies. If thoſe prudent and political maxims in eſtabliſhing colonies, were juſt, ſolid, and true ſome years ago, or even a hundred years ago, as undoubtedly they were moſtly ſo, why are they not true now? What changes has happened in the nature of things? What revolutions or convulſions has the world undergone of late, to juſtle reaſon and folly, wiſdom and madneſs into their oppoſite ſtations?

The

The pamphlet I have mentioned, *viz.* The Intereſt of Great-Britain conſidered, is a very ſingular one, to anſwer it fully would be too tedious for you to read or me to write, I ſhall however glance at its maxims and concluſions in general as briefly as I can, not having the time to beſtow upon it that it merits.

The general plan of it is, that all North-America in our poſſeſſion muſt make us the greateſt people in the world, no people to controul the growth of our colonies, they will extend ſo far, and multiply ſo faſt, that at preſent they double their number in leſs than twenty years, under all the diſadvantages of turbulent neighbours, and murderings, and ſcalpings, and will therefore increaſe much faſter when Canada is added; the trade we ſhall enjoy from ſuch a large and wealthy country is painted out fully; its inviting ſoils, its rivers and lakes for navigation, the flax, hemp, ſilk, wool, and naval ſtores it can ſend home, and all theſe golden proſpects are ſet off to ſuch advantage, as puts me in mind of a ſimile in an old Engliſh love-ſong, where the honeſt ſincerity and fondneſs of a young unpractiſed ſwain in the hands of a gilded or painted beauty, well trained in female arts, is repreſented as follows:

Thus in the ſun be-dropt with gold
The baſking adder lies,
The ſwain admires each ſhining fold,
Then graſps a ſnake and dies.

I hope we ſhall be wiſer than graſp this gilded ſnake and be bit to death: will people conſider that thoſe ſhining advantages North-America has beyond any other country we know, is the very thing that creates our danger; what ought to put us moſt upon our guard, he ſays, they double their numbers in leſs

than twenty years. Now let us ſuppoſe that the inhabitants of our own colonies and all Canada, old and young, male and female, were juſt one million, twenty years hence they are two millions, in forty years four millions, in ſixty years eight millions, in eighty years ſixteen millions, in a hundred years, juſt one century, thirty-two millions; now will all thoſe people look on idle in every thing but hoeing the ground, as we make the negroes do here in Guadaloupe, while they have the ſame liberty you have in England, while you ſee every week in your newspapers advertiſements of high premiums offered to the ſkilful in every individual trade in England, to indenture for a term of years to ſome part of North-America, and going off in every ſhip, this does not drain us of any uſeful people, he ſays, nor will it ever propagate any of thoſe trades or manufactures in America, though they have many more hands to employ, and cheaper living: can any reaſonable man give ear to ſuch abſurd notions?

On the contrary, every ſenſible man I have ſeen, who has made any halt in North-America aſſures me, that the woollen manufactures in particular have come a good length there; that every other trade advances gradually; that the hats of North-America are much finer than in England, and when one or two are brought over to England they give near double the price of the beſt of their own; thoſe that have come from Canada affirm, that the French woollen manufactures there are very conſiderable; can any man fancy that the world will take his ſingle aſſertion in oppoſition to theſe well-known facts, founded upon the beſt authorities? Manufactures cannot come to perfection in a year, they advance in proportion as the ſtate increaſes in people. Was it not the opinions of all thoſe that wrote upon theſe ſubjects before the war, that America might prove of fatal conſequence

to

to us, if our poſſeſſions in the Weſt-Indies were not alſo enlarged, that the Weſt-Indies produced all the wealth, and America only a part of the cauſe? The learned and ingenious Mr. Poſtlethwayt in his Dictionary of Trade and Commerce, the firſt volume, publiſhed *anno* 1751, and compiled at leaſt ſome years before, when the controverſy betwixt America and the Weſt-Indies did not exiſt with that warmneſs it does now, ſhews many of thoſe dangers from North-America, and the ſenſe the French had of the value of thoſe ſugar iſlands, and our lameneſs or inattention there, the dangerous practices of the North-Americans againſt Great-Britain are too well known already, and during this war they trade with all the French, Spaniſh, Dutch and Daniſh ſettlements, to the great detriment of the trade of Great-Britain.

But ſince this cannot open our eyes, will they not very ſoon go greater lengths as they increaſe in people? This learned author does not ſee any danger from North-America for ſome centuries, but I think it is ſhewn before, that one century makes them thirty-two millions of people, about four times the number in Great-Britain, then every body will agree they may be dangerous; but granting him for once that it may be three centuries, what a ſchemer is this for the grandeur, eſtabliſhment, and duration of a ſtate, which he calculates to come to an end in two or three centuries; lays imaginary ſchemes for its grandeur and wealth a few years, but ſure and certain meaſures for its deſtruction and ruin in two or three centuries, and that deſtruction too the works of its own hands. Theſe are very new and very refined notions of government ſurely; what would have been our ſtate now had our predeceſſors ſchemed as ſolidly for us?

Let us then deſpiſe his gilded pills of deſtruction, and follow more ſolid meaſures; let us hold faſt by thoſe valuable ſugar iſlands from whence the wealth and naval ſtrength of France has ſprung and ſubſiſted, thoſe iſlands that can never endanger our liberty, or ruin our trade, but muſt always remain dependant, and continue the fruitful ſource of our wealth and naval power. In that caſe our wealth and grandeur may ſubſiſt and endure as long as the inſtability of human affairs can permit any ſtate to flouriſh.

He dwells much upon the expence of a war in America, and the great merit of preventing the like expence for the future, he ſees ſurely what every other man ſees, that the French have ruined their country more than ever they did at any time in ſo ſhort a period by their ill-judged war in America, where the advantages of circumſtance muſt always be on our ſide, as ſuch war is carried on moſtly by ſea, and that we are much ſtronger on the continent of America than they, and more powerful at ſea; ſo that by attempting to ſupport the war in America, and their ſchemes in that country from Old France by ſea, their marine ſtrength was weakened and loſt, their trade followed, and their wealth from the Weſt-Indies being ſtopt, bankruptcy enſued. Is it for theſe reaſons he repines ſo much at the expence of the war in America, becauſe it has ſunk the power, ambition, and naval ſtrength of France? Theſe authors have told us France will never be at peace with us, therefore we muſt exclude them from North-America, the place in the world where we muſt have the greateſt advantages over them in war, and which the preſent times have fully demonſtrated. Pray, whether is it the intereſt of France, or the intereſt of England, he has at heart?

The French, he tells us, will eaſily part with it: this we abſolutely agree in. I believe they will, as they ſee it has nigh ruined them, they will eaſily part with what has been deſtructive, for thoſe ſugar iſlands which had raiſed their wealth and naval ſtrength to ſuch a pitch as it had arrived at before the war, they will eaſily part with it, becauſe they ſee how it can be productive of the ruin of Great-Britain in a very ſhort period, more clearly than I have deſcribed in thoſe brief letters. But are theſe the ſolideſt reaſons for us to act by? What is the intereſt of France can never be the intereſt of Britain too; for us to follow the tracks pointed out to us by France, I am afraid would prove the certain paths of deſtruction.

This author I am now glancing at has given us at the end an abſtract of the exports from England to North-America, and the Weſt-Indies comparatively, and at different periods, to prove to us the great value of North-America above the Weſt-Indies, but I think it has a very contrary effect if rightly conſidered; the firſt period is from the year 1744 to 1748, a period of war, when the troops and fleets ſent to North-America far exceeded thoſe ſent to the Weſt-Indies; and yet the exports to the ſmall ſpots we have in the Weſt-Indies was as great as the exports to all the extenſive and populous colonies of North-America to a trifle. The next period is from 1754 to 1758, a time that we have ſuch vaſt armies and fleets in that quarter of the world, and when all the colonies are in arms, they muſt have more demands from England than when they are induſtriouſly cultivating the ground, and following their trades and manufactures.——In this period America riſes far above the Weſt-Indies, but when theſe armies and fleets are withdrawn, America will return to what it was.

Is it not from this very plain that the acquiring more of the ſugar iſlands would make the exports to theſe iſlands double what it is to America, and double the trade from the Weſt-Indies to America at the ſame time; and yet all thoſe iſlands far from the extent of territory that one of thoſe American provinces contains, with this difference, that thoſe iſlands will increaſe in their demands from the mother-country, and for ever remain dependant; but thoſe of America can only have demands from the mother-country while in their infancy, for when they riſe to maturity they muſt rival Britain in all her manufactures, as they will have wool, cotton, flax, hemp, raw-ſilk, and iron, cheaper than in England, and more hands to employ. The eaſy carriage of theſe materials by lakes and rivers from the internal parts of the country to the ſea-ports, ſo as they may be ſhipped for England and manufactured there, our author has made very plain and eaſy; but the ſame conveniency ariſes to themſelves for carrying thoſe materials round all their manufacturing towns and villages where they can uſe them, unleſs where you keep troops to take theſe things from them by force, and burn their looms: to prevent which inconveniency to this favourite country, our author has ſurely hit the moſt effectual method, and indeed it is the maſter-piece of the book, *viz.* "To keep no troops there, but "put arms in the hands of the people; let them "raiſe troops and forts as they think proper."

He ſeems fully ſenſible how popular the cry is of ſaving expence, and how eaſy it is ſwallowed without any examination at all. When we are poſſeſſed of all North-America, ſays he, "We ſhall "have no expence in maintaining garriſons there, "ſome few, however, may be neceſſary to ſecure "the goods of the traders, and protect the commerce "in caſe of any ſudden miſunderſtanding with any

"tribe

" tribe of the Indians; but theſe forts will be beſt " under the care of the colonies themſelves, and gar- " riſoned by their provincial forces at their own ex- " pence; their own intereſt will induce the American " colonies to take care of ſuch forts, and ſee the " officers do their duty and keep their corps full, &c." I ſhall copy no more of it, but refer you to the 13th and 14th pages of the book.

Now his budget is opened, leaſt America ſhould not be able to throw off her dependance upon Britain early enough: giving them the power of raiſing troops and training them at their own option, without any controul or dependance upon Britain, will certainly do the buſineſs, will accompliſh the end propoſed moſt effectually; if we ſhould keep any troops there and garriſon theſe forts, he ſhews you in the 14th page it would be to no purpoſe, the Britiſh are ſo corrupt, abominable raſcals, that they would be onlymilitary monks, and exiſt no where but in a muſte-rroll on paper. This aſperſion upon our country and army, at a juncture when all the world admires them, one cannot read without the greateſt reſentment, as well as be alarmed at the audaciouſneſs of the propoſal, under all the diſguiſe it is introduced.

It is but very lately that the Britiſh had arms put in their own hands, every man amongſt you remembers that the military bill was thrown out, by a great majority in the houſe of lords, May, 1756, after full debate, and at a juncture when we were ſo threatened with an invaſion from France, that we neceſſarily brought over, 14,000 foreign troops to ſupport us againſt ſuch invaſion; who knows, but after we are enervated by a few years peace, that bill may be again thrown out, and England remain diſarmed, while her extenſive colonies in North-America enjoy the privilege of raiſing what armies they pleaſe independant of

us,

us, theſe garriſons, he ſays, muſt be at ſuch a diſtance up the country, as we in England could not know if they exiſted any where but in a muſter-roll; we can far leſs know with any certainty what number of troops the colonies may chuſe to keep there, which muſt ever be a ſecret from us, until they chuſe to ſhew them in their military capacity: if thoſe North-Americans ſhall in one century be above thirty millions of people, as we have ſhewn from this author, with well-trained armies of their own; will they ſtand waiting till we ſend them cloathing from England, or will they make for themſelves, where they have better materials and cheaper work? What manufactory, or what branch of trade, are they not capable of taking from us?

Now if Canada was to be kept, the neceſſity of having more ſugar iſlands comes with double force upon us, becauſe the diſproportion complained of betwixt our poſſeſſions in North-America, and thoſe of the Weſt-Indies, becomes thereby much greater in place of being remedied: our author ſhews us how faſt theſe countries will multiply in people, by the acceſſion of Canada. The few ſugar iſlands we have, excluſive of Guadaloupe, are not able to ſerve the conſumption of Great-Britain and Ireland by 10,000 hogſheads a year. America muſt conſume as much as Britain, they muſt have it, particularly rum, they cannot ſubſiſt without it. Since its plain we cannot ſupply them, they muſt take theſe things, rum, ſugar and molaſſes, from the French; they have ſhewn us even in the preſent war, a war entirely upon their own account, that they chuſe to trade with the French ſugar iſlands, rather than with ours, and neceſſity muſt compel them more, if Canada ſhould be retained by us, without the ſugar iſlands at the ſame time be acquired. The French ſugar iſlands of St. Domingo, Guadaloupe, Mary Gallante, Martinico, the Granada's, Dominico and St. Lucia, in which two laſt they

they have governors at this hour, muſt all of them double their value, by the great conſumption from America. I have already ſhewn that the great increaſe of the wealth and naval ſtrength of France, aroſe from thoſe ſugar iſlands; now it muſt be doubled in place of being weakened by this war, and Canada in the poſſeſſion of the Britiſh, become more inſtrumental and productive of the grandeur, ſhipping, and wealth of France, than it could poſſibly have been while in the poſſeſſion of the French themſelves, unleſs we acquire the ſugar iſlands at the ſame time; thoſe Freneh ſugar iſlands will take nothing from thoſe Americans but money while they have it, maſts, *&c.* for ſhipping, hemp, iron, and naval ſtores, or furs and wool, all to ſend home to France. In a word, every ſcheme in this treatiſe of the intereſt of Great-Britain conſidered, whatever way you take it, has a direct tendency to the aggrandizing of France, and ruining of Great-Britain: a ſhort view of his maxims follows.

He ſays, page 23, and many other places, that our people in America increaſe ſo faſt as to double their number in leſs than 20 years, and by adding Canada they will encreaſe much faſter. Page 37, "That Penſilvania doubles its inhabitants every 16 years," he tells us, at the head of the 17th page, that, "The bulk of "the inhabitants of North-America are landed owners, "whoſe lands are inferior to thoſe of Great-Britain, "only by the want of an equal number of people." It has been ſhewn, that in one century they exceed 30 millions, four times the number in Britain, then their lands are better than ours; at the end of the ſame 17th page, he ſays, "Unprejudiced men well know that all the "penal and prohibitory laws that ever were thought "on, will not be ſufficient to prevent manufactures, "in a country whoſe inhabitants ſurpaſs the number "that can ſubſiſt by the huſbandry of it:" upwards of 30 millions of people can never ſubſiſt upon agriculture

ture only, if they have not more conſumption for their produce, than the few ſugar iſlands we have can afford them, therefore manufactures muſt be well advanced, before they have encreaſed to 30 millions before one century, (as in fact they are tolerably advanced already) add to this the ſcheme of putting arms in their hands, page 13, to raiſe what forts they pleaſe, and maintain as many regular troops as they think proper, independant of Britain, and then you have a clear, ſhort view, of the ſcheme he would perſuade you into, and what he aims at.

He does not ſeem in any part of his long treatiſe to diſown what I all along advance, that Canada joined to what we have in America will prove our deſtruction, but he only ſhifts it off to a greater diſtance, it muſt take ſome centuries, he ſays; now I think from his maxims as well as mine, it cannot be above the diſtance of a century, if ſo much, nay, if he is as young as his ſchemes are new and unſolid, he may poſſibly live to feel the completion of them himſelf. If thoſe ſeparate ſtates or colonies in North-America ſhould never unite, as he has been at great pains to prove they never can, (without making many converts I believe) our danger is much the ſame; for if in ſeparate ſtates, they ſhould ruin our trades, manufactures and commerce, ſo as we have no vent for any thing in America or the Weſt-Indies, where ſtand we? France is both at hand, and united to do the reſt of the buſineſs chearfully, effectually, and, I believe, might prove rather the worſt maſters of the two. I think I need ſay no more to diſcredit this political guide and his ſchemes.

Give me only leave to ſuppoſe that the French, a moſt political people, and who generally gain as much in the negotiating a peace, as they loſe during the war, ſenſible of the liberty of the preſs in England, ſhould procure hirelings to publiſh their ſchemes to the people of

of Briton, and take every popular handle to delude them into error, in what manner would ſuch French miſſionaries attack us, but by gilding North-America with poetical fiction; to inflame the popular, but falſe ambition of extent of territory, ſo often prejudicial, in the annals of hiſtory, that as we have found ſome conſiderable advantages, from thoſe colonies in their infancy, we may fancy thoſe advantages will ſtill riſe with the colonies themſelves, without perceiving the certain ruin that follows to our trade and manufactures from ſuch growth of ſo extenſive colonies in the ſame, and finer climates; that while we are giddy with ſucceſs, if we could be ſo dazzled with thoſe gilded phantoms of ambition as turn our eyes from the ſugar iſlands, and leave France in poſſeſſion of thoſe treaſures, ſhe would again raiſe her wealth and marine force, from that quarter, with more rapidity than ever; while we were working our own deſtruction in America, without any expences to them. That in this ſcheme, the proprietors of the ſugar iſlands we have, might probably be drawn in, to co-operate from the danger of leſſening the value of their poſſeſſions in the Weſt-Indies; by any more acquiſitions there, without duly attending to future conſequences, as immediate advantages often blind mens eyes to more remote dangers: that if ſo great a body of opulent and wealthy people, could be gained or deceived, their influence would be very conſiderable in the councils of Great-Britain. That if we could be yet further deluded (by the plauſible pretext of ſaving expence) to keep no troops in America, but leave the colonies the power of what troops and forts they pleaſe to raiſe for their own ſecurity, the buſineſs would ſoon be accompliſhed; the ſeeds of our deſtruction being once planted and ſprung in ſo fertile a ſoil, would ſoon ripen.

Could the French policy and ingenuity lay any ſcheme in their preſent ſituation more ſubtle, and, at the

the ſame time more effectual for our ruin, though it may be ſlow in its operations, yet it becomes the more certain in its effect, and thus all our fame and victories by ſea and land turn to our own ruin, for want of that ſteadineſs in uſing ſucceſs, that we ſhewed in obtaining it; we ſhall then ſtand like Hector ſhining in the arms of Achilles,

A blaze of glory ere we fade away.

But I hope for better things while it is yet in our power to make the choice, that we ſhall follow the ſure and certain paths to proſperity, and leave the dangerous and dubious flights of ambition after extent of territory, often if not always deſtructive.

If our own patriots ſhould then approach us with their advice and counſel, in the ſame manner and ſtrain that a French hireling miſſionary would do for our ruin, ought we not to take the alarm, and ſift thoſe counſels and maxims to the bottom, before we adopt them for our guides, maxims, and ſchemes, as new as they are dangerous; and ſupported by arguments as airy and imaginary, as the ſchemes are unſolid and deſtructive?

I have already taken one ſimile from an old Engliſh ballad, and find myſelf now ſtrongly inclined to give you another; as I write only from memory, I cannot direct you where to find it, but it runs thus:

So to fulfil their prince's ends,
Some miſſion'd devils from hell aſcends;
Their budgets with corruptions cramm'd,
The contributions of the damn'd,
Which with unſparing hands they ſtrow,
Round all the people as they goe:
And then at Belzebub's black hall,
Complain their budgets were too ſmall.

I hope the preſent French miſſionaries ſhall ſoon have the ſame reaſon to complain, that their budgets were too ſmall; that Great-Britain could not be dazzled with all their gilded proſpects of America. They had penetration to diſcover the treachery and ruin that lurks in the bowels of this Trojan horſe; that they were fixt and determined to maintain their ſuperiority over France, in their own proper marine element; to cruſh the wealth and naval ſtrength of France, ſo eſſentially centered and rooted in thoſe ſugar iſlands; to leave the falſe and deſtructive ambition of extent of territory, to the more deluded part of the world with whom it may better agree; that they are fixt to the point of maintaining the liberties of Europe, from the reſtleſs ambition of France; to defend and protect the proteſtant religion every where; and to prevent the faggots of an inquiſition from ever blazing in Middleſex; yet, at the ſame time, moſt benignly diſpoſed, to protect all her Roman catholic ſubjects of her old, as well as new dominions, in the full and free exerciſe of their religion, and to bleſs them with all the protection, liberty and freedom, that their religion will ſuffer them to enjoy.

I thought I had done, but theſe laſt lines have ſuggeſted ſome thing, which juſtice calls on me to explain: I am told it has been induſtriouſly ſpread in England, that the French inhabitants of this iſland, are diſſatisfied, turbulent, mutinous, and regardleſs of the terms of capitulation, than which nothing can be more falſe; on the contrary, they appear to be as well ſatisfied with their circumſtances, with the liberties they enjoy both civil and religious, with the government they are under, the trade and advantages they poſſeſs, as any people on earth can be, under the uncertain ſtate they are in, dubious to what power they may belong; that they have maintained and adhered to the articles of capitulation in every circumſtance, with

a ſteadineſs and integrity which muſt do honour to themſelves, and to any ſtate they may belong to; if there has been any deviation at all, I can venture to ſay it has been among the loweſt dregs of the people, with whom I have no intercourſe, and poſſibly may never be rightly informed of what paſſes there; I can alſo affirm, that there is leſs unfair trade carried on here now at this juncture, and for ſome months paſt, than in any other part of the king's dominions.

I am, &c.

LET-

LETTER V.

SIR,

YOU ſeem to inſinuate in your letter that ſome people in London think I write partially in favour of Guadaloupe, I am very well pleaſed to know the ſentiments of every man upon that ſubject, but might not I have ſome reaſon to ſay they judge partially againſt that place without knowing any thing about it, that they are ſo far prejudiced againſt it as not to allow themſelves to take any juſt information upon the ſubject; people unprejudiced are fond of being rightly informed, but the prejudiced are hurt and vexed with every truth which gives a blow to their prejudices; for it is the value of Guadaloupe, not its inſignificancy, that has raiſed ſuch oppoſition to it; the value, wealth and produce of Guadaloupe is dreaded by the reſt of our iſlands as a rival to their private fortunes in the other iſlands, and they are a powerful party in England.

But the more the other iſlands ſtruggle againſt it, the more reaſon we have to keep it, becauſe their private apprehenſions can only proceed from the great

quantity of ſugar, rum, cotton, coffee, &c. that it can produce more than the other iſlands we have can do. If it was a thing of inſignificancy they would entertain no apprehenſions about it. I am very ſenſible what contemptible notions they had of Guadaloupe when I left England, and what pains was taken by ſome people to nouriſh thoſe prejudices, and blind the eyes of the nation from diſcovering its value. Therefore I have been at the more pains to diſcover the truth to my country, and to repreſent things to them as they really are. I make no doubt ſuch truths may ſurprize people at firſt, as they are ſo different from what they were taught with ſo much pains to believe.

I affirm that Guadaloupe, including Grand-terre, which we always look upon as one iſland, being only divided by a ſmall canal of ſalt-water, is of much larger extent than Martinico, and productive of more ſugar; that there is as much good land, free of mountains in Guadaloupe, as the whole extent of Martinico, mountains and all included. That Marie-Gallante is very near the extent of Antigua to a trifle, without a ſingle mountain in it; there is very few ſugar plantations in Marie-Gallante as yet, but it is very capable of producing ſugar, and at preſent yields the beſt coffee and cotton of any of our iſlands, nor would it be believed that this iſland has ſent home many millions of pounds of coffee and cotton to Britain ſince it was in our poſſeſſion, a fact that can be proved and aſcertained in England without coming here for proofs, which, it ſeems from prejudices at home, are diſregarded.

I alſo affirm that this iſland could, in a few years, ſerve all Britain and Ireland with cinnamon, much cheaper than the Dutch do at preſent; and very ſoon after a ſufficiency to export to other countries.

Are theſe things of no conſequence to Britain? Does ſhe chuſe rather to be ſupplied with theſe expenſive articles of ſugar and cinnamon from the French and their Dutch friends, than to have them of her own? Sure the whole ſyſtem of Britiſh policy and intereſt muſt be totally changed ſince I left England, if this be eſteemed partiality. I have alſo aſſerted, that Guadaloupe and its dependencies, in a few years after being annexed to Britain, will yield 150,000 hogſheads of ſugar annually. I adhere to that ſtill, and when I ſay ſo, I am within the bounds of truth. The people here from Antigua and other iſlands, who are eſteemed the beſt judges of ſuch productions, are moſtly of opinion that I might have aſſerted a good deal more, and though I do not differ much from them in opinion, I chooſed not to go to the higheſt eſtimates, but to be upon the moderate ſide; yet if it produce one hundred thouſand hogſheads, its more than all the other iſlands we have can produce, nor can they ſend home ſo much cotton, coffee, and cinnamon.

The exports of this iſland to Britain and America has been as great as any iſland Britain has; and if it is conſidered that it was ſo waſted by a ſiege or war in its bowels for near four months; the burnings of plantations, houſes, and ſugar-works that could not be prevented in ſo long a war, the negroes that were made free, thoſe taken and deſerted, the deſtructions committed by the privateers round ſo extenſive a coaſt, with four month's attention, that neither maſters nor negroes could attend any plantation, it appears rather ſurpriſing that this iſland could ſend home half ſo much as it has done ſo recently after ſuch calamity and deſtruction. Every man that knows any thing of a ſugar-plantation muſt be ſenſible how long it will be of recovering after ſuch misfortunes: this ſeems to be a confirmation of what I ſay of the value of Guadaloupe, rather than any proof of the contrary.

I am at the ſame time of opinion that the conſumption of the Britiſh manufactures will be greatly increaſed from this iſland, and in a few years double what it is now, thus far I affirm from my own knowledge of the place, and what I have carefully attended to for about a year paſt. This ſhort ſtate or account of Guadaloupe I give as juſt and true, conform to the beſt of my judgment, and I muſt know more of it now than thoſe who were never here at all, or gave the leaſt attention that way, even the people of Antigua, who lay ſo nigh this place, and frequently at Baſſaterre, have often aſſured me that they were almoſt as ignorant of the value of Guadaloupe as the people of England were, and thoſe of Jamaica know much leſs of it. Now which of our accounts are to be moſt credited, I upon the place, attentively obſerving every circumſtance I mention, daily converſing with the people of moſt knowledge in thoſe branches of trade, and long trained to it in our own iſlands, or thoſe gentlemen who were never ſo near this place as Antigua, thoſe who act from prejudice and intereſted views, jealous of their private fortunes in the other iſlands from the riches of Guadaloupe.

I ſhall ſay no more of the value of this iſland and its dependencies. If people at home will not open their eyes it is their own faults not mine, but I may be indulged to aſſert, that ſome years ago it was univerſally allowed that our deficiency of territory in the Weſt-Indies was what limited and confined our trade moſt of any thing. Every man who wrote on the ſubject ſhowed us how deficient we were in the Weſt-Indies, how precarious our ſettlements there ſtood, how powerful the French were in thoſe iſlands, how much it had raiſed their naval ſtrength and trade ſince the treaty of Utrecht, that our colonies in North-America might prove dangerous to us, if our territory in the Weſt-Indies were not enlarged, and more carefully attended

tended to, as there our deficiency was moſt ſenſibly felt. If theſe things were as true as they were univerſally acknowledged, ſurely it follows, that the firſt acquiſitions we make ought to be in the Weſt-Indies, where we were moſt weak or deficient, if the intereſt of Great-Britain is to be conſidered or made the rule. That the ſupplying the Weſt-Indies properly with negroes from the coaſt of Africa, was what had contributed ſo much to the rapid progreſs the French made in the Weſt-Indies, amongſt theſe valuable iſlands, and the attention they gave principally to that quarter. Now let us look to the ſenſe our own miniſtry underſtood thoſe things in, how they conſidered the intereſt of the nation.

I am pretty confident I ſhall eſcape the cenſure of partiality in what immediately follows. That the preſent miniſtry who have conducted the war hitherto are the beſt the nation ever was bleſt with in the annals of hiſtory, ſo far as they can be looked into with any certainty, they have judged of the intereſt of the nation upon the moſt ſolid principles, and diſtinguiſhed where her natural ſtrength lay, and how to uſe it moſt for her advantage; no intereſted or private views have influenced their meaſures, no ſcramble for lucrative poſts or employments has either divided them or diverted their ſteadineſs from the true intereſt of the nation; no man ſo powerful as to be protected if he was either negligent or remiſs in his duty, from the higheſt to the loweſt, inſomuch that envy and detraction are ſilent, and parties and factions out of countenance, if not fully reconciled. How has this miniſtry looked upon America and the Weſt-Indies? In what light have they conſidered them? When the war firſt kindled in America and no where elſe, (though it ſoon broke out in Germany,) they ſupported America powerfully, as they knew we were ſtronger there naturally than France was; that France endeavouring

to ſupply that deficiency by ſea from Old France would weaken themſelves, and expoſe their fleets to ours; therefore our ſea armaments were more than ever attended to; as our greateſt ſtrength lay there, and that the expence of ſuch armaments is leſs felt by the nation than any other. America was then all the theme of the people, and the Weſt-Indies never mentioned, but our watchful miniſtry caſt their eyes upon the Weſt-Indies as well as to America and Germany. They ſent fleets to the coaſts of Africa early, and the firſt conquiſts were there. As the French Weſt-Indies had increaſed ſo faſt by their eaſy ſupplying them with negroes from that quarter of the world; thus the firſt effectual foundation was early laid for ſubſequent ſtructures in the Weſt-Indies. Soon after this Cape-Briton was taken, which diſabled the French from ſending any ſuccours to North-America, but at the greateſt expence and riſque. Our miniſtry ſent expeditions of men and ſhips to the coaſts of France, which obliged the French to keep many of their troops at home to guard theſe coaſts, ſuch troops might otherwiſe have caſt the balance in Germany, and no meaſure appears to have been better judged: When the ſeaſon was over for ſuch attempts upon France, then the expedition to the Weſt-Indies ſet out, unexpected by every body, entirely owing to the penetration of the miniſtry themſelves. There a conqueſt was gained by ſix regiments only, the moſt important ever Britain had made for ſome centuries paſt, and the French received the ſevereſt blow. How inſenſibly it was received at home, and from what cauſes, I have hinted in one of theſe letters.

But this conduct of ſo great and able a miniſtry made me turn my thoughts towards the Weſt-Indies, and, from a little reflection, I diſcovered all thoſe advantages ariſing from ſuch increaſe of territory there, as I have deſcribed to you in the courſe of thoſe letters,

and

and which ſurely had influenced our miniſtry in thoſe ſteps they had ſo early taken to pave their way there, when the reſt of the world, nor our countrymen at home, were either talking or thinking of it, but amuſing themſelves with more empty ſhadows. In the year 1759, the affairs of Germany ſeemed to require more aſſiſtance, our miniſtry prudently and wiſely gave it, for if thoſe affairs had gone wrong in Germany, it might have given our other victories over France in Aſia, Africa, and America, a very different turn from what they will have now, by ſuch prudent ſupply to Germany. The French at that period, to prevent our ſupporting Germany, made the moſt lively appearance of invading Britain with their new invented ſcheme of flat-bottomed boats, which they acted with more vivacity than any of their former invading ſchemes. But our miniſtry were not at all frightned by thoſe dreams, they ſupported Germany; they blocked up all the ports of France in the channel, and kept a ſufficient guard over Toulon; at the ſame time brought the militia, our natural and conſtitutional ſtrength, to a moſt reſpectful and ſalutary ſtate and ſituation. But in theſe circumſtances it was impoſſible to think they could ſpare troops from Britain ſufficient for the Weſt-Indies. The war in America had lingered a little; General Amherſt was not able to get up to Montreal before the ſeaſon was gone, and General Wolf found Quebec ſo ſtrongly covered by ſo powerful an army, that the taking of it at that juncture was next to a miracle; yet it was done, and that General greatly fell in the attempt, but will ever be remembered with honour. The conqueſt of that place then was both late and unexpected, ſo that no troops could poſſibly come from America to the Weſt-Indies that ſeaſon, while Montreal was ſtill in the French hands, and their ſtrength there not contemptible.

But now that the war in America is finiſhed; that the French can no longer make head there; that a great part of the troops in America can be brought home, we ſhall ſoon ſee if our great and able miniſtry have relinquiſhed the Weſt-Indies, or continue in the ſentiments they ſo early diſcovered of the importance of thoſe iſlands both to Britain and France; by puſhing the war in this part of the world to reduce the French ſugar iſlands, and thoſe eſteemed neutral, where the French have governors, ſuch as St. Lucia and Dominico. Now only is the time that we could expect ſuch an expedition from ſo circumſpect a miniſtry; for troops from England as they could not be ſpared from duty nearer home, ſo they would have been more expenſive to the nation than the troops from America in their return home; thoſe troops can compleat the conqueſt of theſe valuable iſlands with the leaſt expence to the nation, and are more ſeaſoned for the climate than thoſe from England could poſſibly be; the ſame expence of ſhipping and victualing that could bring theſe troops home to England will bring them here, ſo that it is not half the expence in money, nor probably half the expence of lives.

I would not have people influenced by theſe unſolid conjectures, that our miniſtry look upon Canada as of the utmoſt conſequence to be annexed to Great-Britain, becauſe they puſhed the reduction of it with ſo much vigour, as thoſe meaſures might more probably proceed from its being the moſt prudent and effectual ſtep for putting an end to the war that had broke out firſt there, and raged with moſt fury. To diſable France from making any demands which we might think contrary to our rights and intereſts in that country. But after ſo many troops had been ſent there, not without great expence, it would have appeared extremely abſurd to have withdrawn thoſe troops

for

for any cauſe whatever, until the end was accomplifhed for which they were ſent to that country, while the French were able to make any oppoſition.

If any of thoſe well-judged expeditions againſt the coaſts of France had taken Rochfort and Breſt, every man ſees of what conſequence it would have been, in diſabling the French fleets from diſturbing our country or trade, and thereby putting an end to the war; but would it from thence follow that our miniſtry judged it moſt for our intereſt to keep theſe two places Rochfort and Breſt after a peace. It is juſt ſo in the other caſe, and the retaining all Canada, as pointed out by ſome writers, may appear as abſurd to our miniſtry, and as dangerous as the keeping of Breſt in the other caſe; and no unſteadineſs appear in their meaſures from taking it one year, and reſtoring as much of it at a peace as the French have any juſt title to, and conſiſtent with our own ſafety there. It is a much more reaſonable conjecture to think that ſo great and able a miniſtry, had early, and have ſtill their eyes upon the Weſt-Indies, from the early attempts upon Africa, the place ſo neceſſary for ſupplying the Weſt-Indies with negroes; and then acquiring the moſt valuable of all the Leeward Iſlands, Guadaloupe, where the war had not kindled at all.

I make no doubt it was from theſe obſervations that the learned and eloquent author of the letter to two great men firſt wet his pen in that cauſe, to try if he could blind the miniſtry, or miſlead the nation, to divert the edge of the war from thoſe valuable ſugar iſlands, where France was ſo ſenſibly hurt, and ſo unable to defend. All the nation, I believe, were generally well ſatisfied with the miniſtry, that they underſtood the true intereſt of Britain, and would follow it ſteadily and diſintereſtedly, when this great

dictator

dictator aſſumed the office at his own hand, and gave our miniſtry their inſtructions with a haughtineſs very unbecoming, and very unſuitable to the eſteem and confidence they had ſo juſtly acquired from all men of worth. As there was no viſible cauſe for interpoſing with theſe inſtructions, at that time while the miniſtry were ſo ſucceſsful in theſe moſt ſalutary meaſures; nothing but the dread of puſhing the war in the Weſt-Indian iſlands, which was ſo much the intereſt of the nation, and might be accompliſhed with the ſmalleſt force, could poſſibly influence any man to produce to the world ſuch a ſpirited piece of deluſion, nor could men's eyes be long blinded by the aſſuming the ſanction of a very great man for the father of that piece, the the true father, and his weighty motives were ſoon diſcovered. Canada and Guadaloupe were not the real parties in diſpute; it is Great-Britain and the ſugar iſlands ſhe has, thoſe intereſts jar in this point, and we can eaſily judge with which party the author has enliſted himſelf.

Now allow me to make ſome more obſervations, and draw a few concluſions from them. Firſt, that if we have not a ſufficiency of ſugar iſlands to ſerve Great-Britain and America in ſugar and rum, which I may call the neceſſaries of life, as no family in England can want ſugar twice a day, and few in the north parts of America, can want rum as often; we ought therefore, if poſſible, to acquire more of the ſugar iſlands, at leaſt as much as to ſupply ourſelves; though we ſhould freely give up all the foreign markets to France, a thing very oppoſite to the intereſt of Britain, as no man will diſown that it were much for our advantage, to have more of the ſugar trade, and allow the French as little as we can, ſince it is ſo plain that the French naval ſtrength has in a great meaſure ariſen from that trade.

Secondly,

Secondly, that the Weſt-Indian iſlands we have, ſmall as they are, conſume as much if not more of the produce of Great-Britain, than the American colonies do; therefore if the Weſt-Indies were doubled at this juncture, ſo would the exports from England be doubled; and the whole trade betwixt Britain and the Weſt-Indies, alſo the trade betwixt the Weſt-Indies and America; the Weſt-Indies would demand double from America they now do, and America be thereby enabled to increaſe her demands from England. Thus England and America profit conſiderably by acquiring territories in the Weſt-Indies, but no acquiſition of territory in America, can have that effect upon our Weſt-India iſlands, or raiſe their value.

Thirdly, France draws almoſt all her wealth from the Weſt-Indies, ſo may we; the acquiring neutral iſlands may in ſome ſenſe remedy our deficiency, but not totally, as theſe are but few, and may be many years in peopleing; whereas the French iſlands are pretty well peopled already. If you leave the French in poſſeſſion of all the iſlands they have now in the Weſt-Indies, they muſt ſtill remain too ſtrong for us, and raiſe their naval ſtrength with more rapidity from that quarter after the peace. The French iſlands being taken from them remedies our deficiency, and alſo deminiſhes their ſtrength, it ſerves both ends. You can never humble the trade and naval ſtrength of France but by taking their ſugar iſlands from them, prune thoſe luxuriant branches that carry the faireſt and richeſt fruits of France, then you accompliſh the end propoſed.

The ſugar iſlands muſt always be dependant, but America as ſhe riſes to maturity, may endanger our trade and liberty both. It muſt be abſurd to ſay or think, that when America exceeds us in numbers of people, that ſhe will nevertheleſs continue dependant, becauſe

becauſe independancy is graſped at by all mankind ſince their firſt creation: how impatient are all the children in England, as they advance in years, to be independant of their natural and fond parents; does not the common converſation of all companies in North-America run upon that ſubject; when they can arive at independancy, they wait for it, and expect it with as much impatience, as a girl of fifteen does for her marriage to break looſe from the reſtraint of a watchful mother. Let no man flatter himſelf with thoſe empty phantoms, or fancy that he can alter the nature and paſſions of men, or make them more fond of dependancy in a collective body, than individuals are: it muſt appear equally abſurd to imagine, that North-America as ſhe advances in agriculture, and encreaſes in numbers of people, will not alſo encreaſe in induſtry, arts, trades, manufactures and ſciences; in a country where nature has collected together ſuch profuſion of all the materials and conveniencies that can invite to ſuch induſtry, more than any country we know of; and where liberty bloſſoms and flouriſhes, with more natural and brilliant luſtre, than ever it did in any new eſtabliſhed colonies that we read of ſince the creation of the world: ſuch vain, unnatural, and airy deluſions can never have place amongſt rational people, who have made the leaſt reflection upon human nature, or obſerved the uniform experience of paſt ages.

But if the voice of our country, ſhould ſtill cry ſo giddily after that falſe and deſtructive ambition of extent of territory ſo often prejudicial to other ſtates, yet much more ſo to Britain, and that Canada, at a treaty of peace, were added to the extenſive poſſeſſions ſhe has in North America, what would be the conſequence, many, both fatal and dangerous to Great-Britain would enſue; one is moſt obvious, that we are told how faſt we would multiply in people, and extend ourſelves

over

over ſo rich and extenſive countries; one effect that muſt ſurely follow, therefore if we cannot at preſent, or could not before the war, ſerve ourſelves with theſe articles of ſugar, rum, and other produce of the Weſt-Indies, we muſt feel that deficiency more, when our demands for thoſe articles, will be ſo much encreaſed from North-America. The great growth of North-America, in people and extent of territory, unlimited and uninterrupted from the acquiſition of Canada, muſt ſurely double the value of the Weſt-Indian iſlands, and enrich thoſe kingdoms moſt who have the largeſt poſſeſſions there, *viz.* France, but it can never enrich our own iſlands as they have more conſumption already than they are able to anſwer, and by far the higheſt prices. The great encreaſe of North-America then muſt have this effect, to encreaſe the value of the French ſugar iſlands, where her greateſt wealth, trade, and naval ſtrength lies; it muſt alſo have this other effect, that as North-America encreaſes in people, it muſt rival Great-Britain in all her trades and manufactures, in which the greateſt ſhare of her wealth conſiſts, ſo that theſe acquiſitions in North-America as projected, muſt both inrich France, and impoveriſh Britain to a great degree, an effect very different from what was propoſed by the war, and very different from what any wiſe people would chuſe to reap, as the harveſt of ſo glorious and ſucceſsful a war.

Acquiſitions in the Weſt Indies only can aggrandize Great-Britain, and ſeems to be what ſo able a miniſtry very early pointed at. From that conſideration of itſelf, the nation might have been convinced, that it was their intereſt, and I believe they generally are ſo; ſome few of the many proprietors of thoſe ſugar iſlands we have, may be miſled from ſelf-views, but the generality of them I am confident, have ſounder heads and honeſter hearts, than to perſiſt in thoſe obvious errors, when they take time to reflect more coolly and

and impartially. If any of them continue ſtill to oppoſe the acquiſition of the ſugar iſlands, every man of common ſenſe muſt ſee that it is their own private views and intereſt that ſpirits them on; thus to oppoſe the only probable view of aggrandizing Great-Britain, and humbling France her greateſt rival, leaſt their private fortunes in the few ſugar iſlands we have ſhould ſuffer a little diminution or abatement.

If it was not very vain to give thoſe gentlemen any advice, I would humbly offer one; To conſider ſeriouſly whether 5000*l.* a year, upon the ſureſt and moſt honourable footing, is not preferable to 6000*l.* a year upon the moſt precarious tenure that can be imagined. I would wiſh them to attend to the new favourite play, The Siege of Aquileia, that they may ſee how thoſe great Roman people behaved; young men in the bloom of youth giving themſelves up a ſacrifice for their country, parents giving up their children to death for that cauſe, children who did ſo much honour to the father who begot them, as well as to the mother who gave them birth. Thoſe Weſt-Indians may learn from the ſtage, if no where elſe, how ſhamefully vain their pretenſions are to imitate or equal the Romans; when they would betray their country for a little precarious and imaginary gain to themſelves: however, theſe are but a few, and I hope never will influence the many. We may be comforted from reflecting that in the preſent times we have many inſtances of Roman virtue and fortitude in our countrymen, and bleſt with a miniſtry who may be juſtly placed on a level with the moſt eminent of the Roman conſuls, Cicero not excepted.

I have in the courſe of theſe letters given you my ſentiments of the intereſts of our country in her preſent ſituation, a period the moſt important and intereſting of any we have ſeen, in which the future grandeur,

deur, wealth, liberty, and honour of Britain in a great meaſure depends upon the reſolutions ſhe now takes with regard to America and the Weſt-Indies, and I am not inclined at preſent to ſay any more on the ſubject, for prejudices ariſing from intereſted views can neither be ſilenced, nor will they own conviction; only thus much, that you and your Weſt-Indian falſe brethren can have no handle to ſay that this is written with much partiality or animated with any ſallies of paſſion or prejudice, but a plain narration of facts, and the clear natural conſequences that follow from theſe facts.

I am, *&c.*

Guadaloupe,
December 12, 1760.

FINIS.

0884

D761
G339r